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4Editorial
Welcome to the sixth issue of the
Richmond Journal of Philosophy.  We
have now entered the second year of
publication and have hosted two
successful conferences.  
In the current issue we begin with a
discussion by Peter Simons on the
nature of metaphysics in the last
century or so and some observations
concerning future directions in which
enquiry may develop.  This is followed
by a consideration of one of moral
philosophy’s fundamental questions:
how are we to understand moral
responsibility.  In the first of a two part
piece Garrath Williams tackles the
issue of free will and adumbrates the
approach of Aristotle to moral
responsibility.  In the next issue he will
critically examine Kant’s theory.  Our
third paper focuses on sleep, and in
particular the challenges raised for our
understanding of consciousness.
James Hill’s paper examines the views
of three great early modern
philosophers, Descartes, Locke and
Leibniz.  From sleep we move to trust,
our understanding of which is
discussed by Paul Sheehy.  At the
centre of Plato’s Republic is an
apparent puzzle.  Why the philosopher
would return to the cave having come
to see the Good; why would the
philosopher become king?   D. J.
Sheppard analyses this challenge and
examines the problems it poses for
Plato’s account.  Our final paper moves
us to the twentieth century and the
influential and widely challenged work
of A.J. Ayer.  Pierre Cruse sets out the
key criticisms of the verification
principle and explains how it might be
defended.
The motivation for and ambition of the
journal is to provide serious
philosophy for students who are at an
early stage in their philosophical
studies.  The style and content of the
papers will be accessible to students
who have yet to become hardened to
the more technical and specialised
journals of professional philosophy.  
What do we mean by ‘serious’
philosophy?   First, the content of the
journal is not constrained by a remit to
appeal to or reach the interested
general public.  Whilst the papers
must speak to the needs of students
who are relatively inexperienced in
philosophy, they presuppose that their
audience is actively engaged in
philosophy.  Second, the content is
serious in its focus on the central
areas of philosophy.  The big or
traditional questions of metaphysics,
epistemology, and ethics will provide
the journal’s centre of gravity.  The
third way in which the philosophy is
serious is through the scope, variety
and depth of analysis that can be
achieved by the accumulation of
papers over time.  Moreover, each
paper is not simply an introduction to
one of the main topics on A-level, IB
or degree courses.   Such papers will
indeed have a role in the journal, but
they will not be the only kind.  Our
contributors will be offering original
papers based on their own research.
The journal will be a forum for the kind
of critical engagement and debate
that characterise the practice of
philosophy.  The fourth way in which
the philosophy is serious is in the
contributors themselves.  The vast bulk
of the papers will be written by
professional philosophers engaged in
both research and teaching.
[Editorial]
Purpose of the Journal
Stephen Grant is a full-time lecturer in
philosophy at Richmond upon Thames
College.  He has also taught at King’s
College London where he is
completing his doctorate on the
emotions.  His main interests are in
the emotions, ethics and political
philosophy.  He has published on the
ontological argument.
Dr Paul Sheehy teaches philosophy at
Richmond upon Thames College and
King’s College London.  His main areas
of interest are in metaphysics, political
and moral philosophy and the
philosophy of the social sciences.  His
doctoral thesis was on the ontological
and moral status of social groups, and
he has published papers on social
groups, voting and explanation and
realism.
Paul Sperring is head of the philosophy
department at Richmond upon Thames
College and an A-level examiner in
philosophy. He completed his
undergraduate and masters studies at
The University of Warwick, studying
both analytic and continental
philosophy. He is currently working
towards his PhD at Birkbeck College.
His research interests are metaphysics
and the philosophy of mind.
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About the [Editorial]
Board
From the beginning of Western
philosophy until the 18th century, the
most important part of philosophy was
metaphysics: other parts were
subordinate to it. Aristotle, the editors
of whose works gave us the name
‘metaphysics’, did not invent the
subject, but he first clearly
demarcated it, and signified its
primacy over other parts of philosophy
by the name he used, ‘first philosophy’.
Metaphysics was first in two ways.
Firstly, metaphysics set out the most
general principles applying equally to
all things, such as the principle that a
thing cannot be both in a certain way
and not in that way at the same time.
Secondly, it provided an outline
inventory of the entities available
when describing any subject of
interest, whether it be the basic
constituents of matter, the kinds of
living organisms, the forms of political
organisation, the things investigated
by mathematicians or worshipped by
the devout. The first of these tasks
naturally brings metaphysics into
contact with logic, which investigates
the formal principles of inference and
necessary truth. The second brings it
into contact with the specialised
disciplines which examine the detail of
what there is. Throughout its long and
chequered history, metaphysics has
wavered between these two poles,
now emphasising logic, now the
constraints of empirical science.
With the increasing complication of
scientific knowledge in the 17th and
18th centuries, and the discovery that
the world is not describable wholly in
terms drawn from the experience and
vocabulary of everyday life, it was
perhaps inevitable that metaphysical
claims should be subjected to
criticism. Rationalist metaphysicians
such as Spinoza and Leibniz claimed to
know necessities about the world, but
disagreed what these were, Spinoza
holding there is but one substance,
Leibniz holding there are infinitely
many, and each claiming to prove his
views from first principles. From Locke
through Hume to Kant, more critical
philosophers considered metaphysical
knowledge claims should be subject to
scrutiny as to their origins and
reliability. The upshot of this critical
movement was to topple metaphysics
from its pedestal. Metaphysical claims
about the nature of reality were to be
subject to the same sort of critical
scrutiny as any scientific hypothesis,
and it turned out that they were far
more fallible than had been imagined.
German idealism constituted a
backlash against this criticism, but its
heyday was short, and its unscientific
claims stirred an even fiercer backlash
against metaphysics, which came at
different times in different European
countries in the nineteenth century.
For much of the nineteenth century,
‘metaphysics’ was a dirty word. Like
the British empiricists before them,
critics such as Comte in France and
Mach in Austria proposed a more
modest role for theoretical philosophy,
that of protecting science from wild
metaphysical speculation. In the early
twentieth century, this anti-
metaphysical movement joined with
two growing philosophies driven by a
Kantian emphasis on critical method.





knowledge claims were subject to
scrutiny of the way in which they
come up in our experience. By
‘purifying’ our claims of their
existential weight, Husserl, imitating
Descartes, promised to put science on
a philosophically unshakable
foundation. On the other hand, the
logico-linguistic analysis created by
Frege, Peirce, Peano and Russell in the
service of the new mathematical logic
were turned by Russell, Wittgenstein
and the Vienna Circle into tools for
analysing and showing the limits of
our knowledge by showing the limits
to what we can meaningfully put into
words. The Vienna Circle, following
Mach, went further and declared that
metaphysical claims were literally
meaningless, being unsusceptible to




Criticism, Renewal and the Future of Metaphysics Peter Simons
Metaphysics, What Criticism of Metaphysics
Peter Simons
Criticism, Renewal and the Future of
Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend. 
Mao Zedong
Both of these anti-metaphysical
programmes, that of phenomenology
and that of logical positivism,
collapsed under their own internal
contradictions. Phenomenology
postulated a primacy of subjective
consciousness, transparently and
infallibly describable, but was unable
to sustain its claims because no
Archimedean vantage point of pure
description free of metaphysics was
ever achieved. Logical positivism
found its methodological strictures
subject to its own negative criticism,
and its unexamined metaphysical
assumptions returned through the
back door to undermine it.
To alert observers, these defects were
obvious by mid-century. Later
phenomenologists such as Ingarden
and Merleau-Ponty abandoned
Husserl’s quest for a metaphysics-free
foundation for science and accepted
the best working hypothesis that there
really is an external world with a
plurality of things existing in it
independently of human awareness. In
analytic philosophy there were
divergent reactions. Carnap, who had
been most vociferous in rejecting
metaphysics, became perfectly happy
to posit numerous entities to play
different semantic roles in his account
of truth and meaning in the 1940s,
while continuing to insist that no one
such scheme gave the true inventory
of reality. Carnap’s relative
indifference to the commitments of
his semantic theory was later to be
echoed by W. V. Quine. Quine criticised
Carnap’s sharp division between
questions of meaning on the one hand
and questions of fact on the other,
proposing that we examine our best
working theories and tease the
metaphysics inherent in them out of
an examination of the entities they
quantify over when ‘regimented’ into
the perspicuous medium of predicate
logic. Quine’s celebrated slogan ‘To be
is to be the value of a variable’ drew
attention again to the links between
logic and ontology which had figured
in the early analysis of Russell and
Wittgenstein. 
Wittgenstein himself had long
abandoned any hope of a perspicuous
correspondence between a neat
logical language and a neat logical
world, and his painstaking but
unsystematised later philosophy
examining the details of ordinary
usage carried no general metaphysical
message. Similar scrutiny of ordinary
language was pushed forward by
several philosophers in Oxford, notably
Ryle, Austin and Strawson. Of these,
Strawson introduced the term
‘descriptive metaphysics’ in the
subtitle of his 1959 book Individuals.
Descriptive metaphysics strives in
Kantian fashion to capture those
immutable aspects of the common
human conceptual scheme which we
all must share. Like Quine, Strawson
considered that our use of such a
scheme inevitably involves belief in a
world of independently existing
things, notably material bodies and
psychophysical persons, and their
qualities and relations. Categories like
those of Aristotle were restored
through attention to our daily
linguistic practices, much indeed as
Aristotle had himself found them, but
tempered with a Kantian underpinning
to forestall future criticism. Quine in
the meantime had concluded that the
fit between language and the world,
mediated through our experience and
linguistic behaviour, was sufficiently
loose and multiply interpretable to
make it impossible for us to draw
definite metaphysical conclusions
from any theory. 
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Renewal
This ontological relativity sent Quine’s
views essentially back to those of
Mach, where the role of everyday
beliefs, and of science with its diverse
theoretical posits was simply to make
the most economical overall sense of
our experience.
Both Quine and Strawson helped to
revive metaphysics after the low point
of positivism, but their ways with
metaphysics should by rights have
stopped the subject dead in its tracks
once more: Quine’s because ontology
melted away again, Strawson’s
because nothing essentially new was
left over to be done once the main
points of descriptive metaphysics had
been made. On the contrary,
metaphysics has since the 1960s
continued to grow in strength and
confidence as a philosophical
discipline. Hardly a month goes by
without a new textbook or reader
coming on the market, and
metaphysical controversies resound
through the professional journals with
the liveliness of debate found in
ancient Athens or medieval Europe.
Why is this, and where will
metaphysics go from here?
Up until about 1960 metaphysics had
to overcome the methodological
strictures of its phenomenological and
logico-linguistic critics, and it did so
by using the tools of its opponents,
whether the search for a
phenomenological basis, or for an
adequate account of meaning and
logic. Perhaps the ultimate version of
the view that metaphysics and
ontology are subordinate to
considerations of language and
meaning was the move by Michael
Dummett to transpose questions
about the mind-independent
existence (realism) or otherwise (anti-
realism) of objects of a disputed kind,
into questions about the acceptability
of the certain logical principles in the
relevant area of discourse. The realist
about such disputed entities as
mathematical objects, or future
events, or dispositional properties will
be happy to accept that sentences
about them may be true or false
irrespective of our ability to actually
decide the truth-value, whereas an
anti-realist would confine the
sentences accepted or rejected to
those we could verify or falsify, and
leave other sentences without truth-
value. Dummett’s subordination of
metaphysical considerations to logico-
linguistic ones maintains the contact
between metaphysics, semantics and
epistemology that characterises
Strawson’s and Quine’s metaphysics in
their different ways, but most
subsequent metaphysical debate has
been less subordinate to linguistic
considerations. A milestone in this
change was the revival of discussion
of the venerable problem of universals
by David Armstrong in 1974.
Armstrong considered that the
meaning of general terms has no
relevance to the metaphysical
question whether universals exist, and
he preferred to rely on direct
arguments. General terms might be
meaningful whether or not there are
universals, and the question as to
which universals exist was to be
settled by science rather than in the
linguistic philosopher’s armchair.
Metaphysics lives in contact with the
special sciences, and they raise
problems which leak outside their own
boundaries and reveal a metaphysical
side. Phenomenology grew out of
Brentano’s philosophical psychology,
whereas analytic philosophy grew out
of Frege’s and Russell’s attempts to
provide a logical foundation for
mathematics. After its establishment
as a science in the nineteenth century,
psychology went through its own
methodological upheavals, rejecting
the introspective methods of Wundt
and Brentano in favour of
behaviourism, a methodology
embodying a deflationary philosophy
of mind, influential in the middle
analytic philosophy of Wittgenstein,
Ryle and Quine. The first sign that
metaphysics was reviving outside the
logic and language laboratory came
with the robust metaphysical
materialism of Place, Armstrong and
Smart in Australia. Debates about the
nature of the mental and its relation
to the physical, given its edge by
Descartes’ dualism, had been muted
under the anti-Cartesian influences of
Wittgenstein and Heidegger, and had
been transposed into an issue of
choice of scientific language by
Carnap. Herbert Feigl’s insistence that
the mind–body problem is not a
pseudo-problem but a genuine issue,
together with the realisation that
Ryle’s dispositional analysis of mental
acts would not work for the central
cases of thinking and perceiving gave
the Australian materialists their
impetus. The Australian mind–brain
identity theory, a metaphysical
equation initially dismissed as naive by
European sophisticates, led to a whole
series of ever more varied and
differentiated positions on the mind-
body issue. At the same time the rise
of computers and the prospect of
genuine artificial intelligence,
optimistically announced in 1950 by
the computer pioneer Alan Turing, led
to an increasing debate about the
difference if any between human and
(prospective) machine mentality, as
well as the use of computer models
such as the distinction between
hardware and software to try and
understand mind. The result was to
put philosophy of mind at the centre
of analytic philosophy, displacing logic8
Criticism, Renewal and the Future of Metaphysics Peter Simons
A Hundred Flowers
[Metaphysics]
and language from the central
position it had occupied since the
early twentieth century.
However, the strongest motivation for
reviving metaphysics continued to
come from considerations of logic and
language. From the mid-century,
logicians such as Arthur Prior in
England, Georg Henrik von Wright in
Finland and Saul Kripke in the USA
developed modal logics, dealing with
necessity, tense, belief, obligation and
other subjects. The semantic analyses
of modal logics, anticipated by Carnap,
involved the Leibnizian idea of
possible worlds. The mathematical
success of such analyses convinced
many that the use of logical semantics
could complete for a wider range of
vocabulary the rigorous analysis of
language that Russell had begun, and
replace the informal methods of
ordinary language philosophy.
Carnap’s student Richard Montague
extended this analysis to a wide range
of features of natural language
previously regarded as inaccessible to
logical analysis. In the course of such
analyses, logicians and linguists found
themselves up to their ears in
ontological commitments to times,
worlds, and a host of abstract
mathematical objects such as sets and
functions, and in general were happy
to do so. 
The metaphysical high-water mark of
this development was the modal
realism of David Lewis, who claimed in
his 1987 book The Plurality of Worlds
that alternative possible worlds exist
and are just as real as our own. Lewis
confronted those who greeted this
metaphysical extravaganza with an
‘incredulous stare’ by challenging
them to find an alternative account
promising equal expressive power.
That dispute continues unabated
today.
Lewis’s ontology for the semantics of
modality forced others who rejected it
to offer alternative semantic accounts
with alternative ontologies. Those
utilising only actually existing entities
were called actualist. 
Some actualist views employed states
of affairs as substitutes for possible
worlds, or took them to be the
objective items making modal
propositions true. Another name for
states of affairs is situations, and they
were made the ontological basis of a
wide-ranging semantic account of
natural language, going under the
name of situation semantics. This view
sidestepped the popular model-
theory-inspired semantics deriving
from Tarski and Carnap in favour of an
account in which the participants in a
linguistic exchange are concretely
embedded in the situations on which
they comment and which serve to give
their utterances meaning.
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The idea of a truthmaker, an entity
which by existing makes a proposition
or other truth-bearer true, goes back
to Aristotle, but it flourished in the
logical atomism of Russell and
Wittgenstein, where the truthmakers
were termed facts. One lively strand of
contemporary metaphysics is based on
the idea that some or all true
propositions stand in need of a
truthmaker. The Truthmaker Principle,
that every true proposition has a
truthmaker, was probably first
formulated by C. B. Martin in the
1960s but emerged in print much later
in the 1980s. A restricted Truthmaker
Principle deriving from
phenomenology as much as from
logical atomism was proposed
independently in 1984 by Mulligan,
Smith and Simons, who identified
individual accidents or tropes as a
primary source of truthmakers. Unlike
the correspondence theory of truth,
which requires a suspiciously cosy
one-to-one correspondence between
truths and what makes them true,
truthmaker theories allow that truths
may have more than one truthmaker,
for example a disjunction, both of
whose disjuncts are true, has as
truthmakers those for both disjuncts,
although either would have sufficed
alone. 
Later truthmaker theories diverge over
how rich and numerous they take
truthmakers to be. Truthmaker
maximalism requires at least one
truthmaker for every truth, whereas
John Bigelow’s principle that truth
supervenes on being requires only that
there be some sufficient reason,
resting ultimately on what there is and
is not, for why a given proposition is
true rather than false, but this does
not always amount to a true
proposition’s having a truthmaker. 
The other respect in which truthmaker
theories differ is in what entities they
evoke as truthmakers. The most
popular choice has been states of
affairs, following the lead of Russell
and Wittgenstein. Indeed David
Armstrong, a leading truthmaker
maximalist, contends that the world is
composed ultimately of states of
affairs, a view found also in situation
semantics. Other truthmaker theories
have looked for other entities to do
the truthmaking role, either a single
kind, such as tropes, or a mixture of
kinds.
The term ‘trope’ is due to Donald C.
Williams, an American philosopher
whose work achieved its deserved
prominence long after it was written
in the mid-century. Williams,
influenced in some measure by
Husserl, proposed a single-category
ontology of tropes. Tropes are
individual instances of properties, such
as individual rednesses or roundnesses,
located where their particulars are,
and different in differing particulars. A
similar conception of properties as
‘thin’ or ‘abstract’ particulars was
proposed earlier in the century both by
Husserl and by G. F. Stout, but the idea
goes back to Aristotle’s Categories and
was standard in the Middle Ages and
early modern period. Tropes offer
nominalists a way to rebut many of
the criticisms of realists about
universals, avoiding some of the
difficulties of earlier and more radical
forms of nominalism such as that of
Nelson Goodman in the USA or
Tadeusz Kotarbinski in Poland. In the
hands of Williams and followers such
as Keith Campbell and John Bacon,
tropes are proposed as the sole
ontological basis category, universals
being considered as classes of tropes
grouped by resemblance while
substances are classes of tropes
grouped by a link such as compresence
in space and time. 
An aside in David Lewis’s The Plurality
of Worlds claims that the only way to
make sense of change is to suppose
that objects that persist, or exist at
different times, have temporal parts,
as do events and processes. Such
occurrents typically are extended in
four dimensions: three of space and
one of time. They thus perdure, that is,
spread through time by having
different phases, by contrast with
substances such as Strawson’s bodies
and persons, which endure, that is, are
present as a whole at each time at
which they exist. Such continuants are
typically three dimensional, being
extended only in space. Lewis claimed
that continuants cannot be said to
have contrary properties at different
times without either making
properties relations to times, or
indulging in presentism, the view that
only the present is real, and past and
future do not exist. He thus advocated
a four-dimensionalist account of
ordinary continuants, giving them
distinct temporal parts to bear the
contrary properties. 
Lewis’s argument and the responses to
it brought it into connection with
ongoing discussions of the
dispensability or otherwise of the idea
of real tense, that is, an ontological
distinction between past, present and
future, put forward under the name
‘A-Series’ as essential to time in John
McTaggart’s famous 1908 argument
for the unreality of time. Tensers, or
proponents of the A-Series, contrast
with detensers, those who say time10






consists only of the B-Series, times
connected by relations of earlier and
later. Often tensers defend the three-
dimensional account of change while
detensers defend the four-dimensional
account, though in fact the two
oppositions are independent of one
another. An unintended side effect of
Lewis’s criticism was to prompt several
philosophers to defend the otherwise
improbable doctrine of presentism.
Lewis’s view of change echoes similar
ones put forward by Russell,
Whitehead, Carnap and others earlier
in the 20th century, in response to the
conceptual strains set up by Einstein’s
relativity theory. Whitehead’s and
Russell’s view that the world is
composed of events was a revisionary
metaphysic which went into abeyance
in the mid-century, to be revived by
Lewis’s arguments and somewhat
earlier by semantic arguments from
Donald Davidson. Davidson contended
that the best way to account for the
logic of statements about action, such
as the inference from Sam sliced the
salami in the bathroom at midnight to
Sam sliced the salami, was to follow a
suggestion of Frank Ramsey’s that
such statements contain a tacit
quantification over events: roughly
speaking, There was an event whose
agent was Sam, whose object was the
salami, whose instrument was a knife,
whose temporal location was
midnight and whose spatial location
was the bathroom. 
Dropping one or more of the conjoined
clauses and translating back into usual
idiom would reveal the inferred
sentence as an instance of
conjunction elimination, not of some
esoteric logic of adverbs. Davidson’s
analysis rapidly won converts to an
ontology of events and has become
the standard view among linguists. It
coincided with a vigorous period of
investigation into the ontology of
action, and a range of divergent
ontologies of events emerged, some
like Davidson saying events were sui
generis individuals, Quine holding with
Russell that they were simply the
contents of any portion of spacetime,
others such as Jaegwon Kim saying
they were property exemplifications,
and yet others such as Roderick M.
Chisholm saying they were states of
affairs. This debate subsided without
being resolved, the variety of theories
being later enriched by the suggestion
of Jonathan Bennett that events are
tropes. Nevertheless, whereas in the
mid-century events were much less
respected than substances as primary
entities in the metaphysical
menagerie, now the boot is on the
other foot: few metaphysicians
question the existence of events,
whereas the concept of substance is
much less central than it was.
Metaphysics re-emerged reinvigorated
in the twentieth century. Its debates
lie at the centre of philosophy, as they
did in ancient and medieval times.
Metaphysical issues now permeate
philosophical discussion of areas once
considered to provide the scientific
replacement for metaphysics, such as
the philosophy of mathematics and
the philosophy of physics. Computer
scientists and intelligence artificers
have borrowed the word ‘ontology’ to
designate platform- and
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n - i n d e p e n d e n t
representations of objects in many
domains of interest. Their use of the
term touches the metaphysician’s use
only tangentially, but the task of
providing computer-based
representations for objects from all
walks of life raises philosophical
questions about the relative merits of
alternative schemes for describing
things, of the sort that linguists
discussed in the 20th century. It is no
accident that the large-scale CYC
project of artificial intelligence led by
Doug Lenat organises its data,
intended to capture the commonsense
knowledge that humans instinctively
enjoy, around a systematic ontology. 
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The Future of
Metaphysics
Computer representation is bound to
raise anew the kinds of question
metaphysicians and philosophers of
language have long pondered. In fact
many of the more serious, rigorous
and systematic attempts to
investigate the natures of things from
many domains now take place among
computer scientists and cognitive
scientists. Such attempts to represent
the knowledge that human beings
bring to bear on everyday situations
and everyday language bid fair to
reiterate positions and concerns of
mid-century ordinary language
philosophy, only this time with
machines.
By contrast, the kinds of metaphysical
issue raised by the application of
metaphysics to the sciences is likely,
because science does not confine itself
to the explication of common sense, to
result in revisions of our conceptual
scheme, of the sort envisaged by the
revisionary metaphysicians of the
early 20th century, like Bradley,
McTaggart, Alexander and Whitehead.
Metaphysics in the 21st century could
go in one of two directions. It could
retreat again to the modest,
descriptive and conservative variety,
metaphysics within the bounds of
epistemology, proposed by Kant and
seconded by Strawson. Or the
metaphysical enterprise could boldly
go into new areas of application, such
as medicine, biology, chemistry,
engineering, economics and
management, where computer
modelling requires more than
commonsense knowledge
representation.
Because of the increasing
specialisation of all sciences, including
philosophy, there is the risk that
metaphysics too could become
compartmentalised into disjoint areas
with barely any communication
between them. Philosophy tends to
resist compartmentalising more than
the special sciences, but social and
market pressures apply to philosophers
and promote specialisation at the
expense of synoptic visions. Certainly
the trend of much late 20th century
philosophy has been to narrower
specialisation. The sheer volume of
knowledge makes it ever more unlikely
that a future Leibniz or Hegel could
synthesise knowledge into a single
system.
Nevertheless, though philosophers
make poor prophets, I beg to state
how I would like metaphysics to
develop over the next hundred years,
even if I am unsure whether it will do
so. My vision for future metaphysics is
that it should be untrammelled by the
need to conform to ordinary language
12
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or the restrictions of our everyday
view of things. It should be bold and
revisionary. It should abandon the
reliance on mathematics and logic
that has narrowed its vision in the
twentieth century. It should treat the
need to find place for a credible theory
of linguistic meaning as a constraint
rather than a method. It should draw
on the wisdom of the great
philosophers, and not pretend it is a
kind of advanced science needing to
refer to nothing more than five years
old. It should reject a priori methods
and certainty and be thoroughly
fallibilistic, open to revision from
within by argument and from without
by scientific advance. It should
encourage team effort and
cooperation among metaphysicians
and others, to counteract the
pressures of specialism. It should be
pluralistic, not because all the
different views are somehow relatively
right, but because, as Mao (all too
briefly) recognised, the truth is more
likely to emerge from the contention
of competing theories than from the
dictates of orthodoxy or fashion. It
should be prepared to consider and
engage in applications in areas
hitherto considered remote from its
concerns. It should aspire to be
integrative and systematic, putting the
various kinds of entity as putatively
disclosed by all the special disciplines
into a single overarching categorial
scheme. If the late twentieth century
was a heyday of analytic metaphysics,
may that of the twenty-first be
synthetic.
University of Leeds.
To reference all the philosophers
mentioned in passing in this article
would double its length. If anyone
wishes chapter and verse for any
allusion, they are welcome to e-mail
me at p.m.simons@leeds.ac.uk.
Instead I will list some of the best
books available for getting to grips
with the lively modern metaphysical
literature.
Hales, Steven D., ed. Metaphysics:
Contemporary Readings. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth, 1999.
Kim, Jaegwon and Sosa, Ernest, eds.
Metaphysics. An Anthology. Oxford:
Blackwell, 1999.
Laurence, Stephen and Macdonald,
Cynthia, eds. Contemporary Readings
in the Foundations of Metaphysics.
Oxford: Blackwell, 1998.
Loux, Michael J. Metaphysics. A
Contemporary Introduction. London:
Routledge, 2001.
Loux, Michael J. Metaphysics.
Contemporary Readings. London:
Routledge, 2001.
Loux, Michael J. and Zimmermann,
Dean W., eds. The Oxford Handbook of
Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003.
Lowe, E. Jonathan. A Survey of
Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002.
Van Inwagen, Peter. Metaphysics.
Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002.
Van Inwagen, Peter and Zimmermann,
Dean W., eds. Metaphysics: the Big
Questions. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998.
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Suggested Reading
The American legal philosopher, Joel
Feinberg, once observed that ‘moral
responsibility… is a subject about
which we are all confused.’ (1970: 37)
Here I want to contrast two influential
philosophical accounts of why we
make responsibility attributions – for
instance, by praising and blaming
people, in saying that someone
deserves to be punished, and so on. In
these practices, we respond to other
people – and ourselves – as the
authors of their actions. If they act
well, we feel they deserve our
admiration and sometimes gratitude
or loyalty. If they act badly, we will
tend to resent them, and feel they
ought to make up for their actions, or
perhaps even be punished. And we
often feel guilty, remorseful and
sometimes proud of how we have
acted ourselves. In short, we think of
people as morally responsible.
One very influential approach to this
subject is broadly Kantian. This view
sees responsibility for actions as
stemming from our ability to exercise
self-control. On this account moral
responsibility exists because a person
freely chooses her actions, and tends
to lead us toward the idea of free will.
In addition, because praise and blame
respond to the person as the chooser
of her deed, they recognise her dignity
as a rational agent, as modern
followers of Kant tend to put it. A
much older approach goes back to
Aristotle. This view situates
attributions of responsibility in terms
of our on-going relationships with one
another. This more nuanced approach
stresses the importance of mutual
accountability, moral education, and
assessments of character in terms of
the many vices and virtues.
I will not try to convey the exact
details of these philosophers’
accounts. What I do want to show are
two things. First, how their ways of
looking at mutual accountability
capture important parts of our
everyday commonsense. One modern
commentator claimed that, in our
attitudes to moral responsibility, ‘we
are all Kantians now’ – by ‘we’
meaning not just philosophers but all
Western persons (Adkins, 1960: 2).
Another central figure in this debate,
Bernard Williams, agrees that Kant
captured a widespread tendency of
modern moral thinking, but also
claims that there exist important
counter-tendencies in our practices of
responsibility. For Williams, ancient
Greek understandings are actually
more realistic and helpful than the
Kantian one. I think Williams is quite
correct in this, and the second point of
these articles will be to suggest that
so far as our ideas of moral
responsibility actually make sense,
they are best captured by a (roughly)
Aristotelian account.
In this first part of the article, I want
to sketch two things. First, I will say
something about the idea of free will.
The paradoxes involved in this idea
often occur to people even before they
come to philosophy, and these
difficulties will be central to Kant’s
account. But second, before turning to
Kant, I would like to tackle Aristotle’s
broad approach, and show that, before
free will was invented by Christian
philosophers, there was a quite
different way of thinking about moral
responsibility – one that has much to
teach us.
In the second part of the article, to
appear in the next issue, I ask why
Kant’s account continues to attract
many people who would not dream of
calling themselves Kantians – indeed,
many who have never even heard
Kant’s name. Kant’s theory involves a
powerful idea of moral worth based on
choice. This idea, though problematic
because of the idea of freedom it
seems to depend on, does account for
many of our intuitions about moral
responsibility. But it is not the only
explanation of these intuitions, nor – I
will argue – is it the most plausible. 
The free will debate has become an old
chestnut of modern philosophy. It is an
intuitively plausible way of
approaching the issues – familiar to
many even before they encounter
philosophical texts. It is perhaps14
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surprising, then, that this debate is
actually a rather modern one.
The basic gist is this: if I am to be
responsible (really responsible) for my
conduct, then it must be within my
control. However, if it is true that
every event in the universe is
determined by causal laws, then this
must be true of the events that
constitute my actions. Therefore, my
conduct cannot really be within my
control; therefore, I am not really
responsible for my conduct. Two
conclusions immediately suggest
themselves. One is that it is incoherent
to praise or blame me – and everyone
else – for our actions, because it is so
difficult to doubt the causal well-
orderedness of the universe. The
alternative conclusion, scarcely more
appealing, is that the human will
somehow sits outside this causal
framework – ie, we have free will –
because it is unthinkable that our
moral ideas be so desperately
incoherent.
Both lines of thought are
incompatibilist; that is, they see the
ideas of responsibility involved in
praise and blame as incompatible with
the causal well-orderedness of the
universe. But while both attract some
limited support among philosophers,
the overwhelming consensus now lies
with compatibilism. This is simply the
thesis that responsibility and causal
order are compatible. Most
philosophers agree that the alleged
incompatibility results from some
important confusions, although there
is much less consensus about what
these may be. At least one area of
confusion is clear, however, and forms
the central issue of this article: what
sort of responsibility for conduct is
involved in praise and blame? Several
familiar points in the free will debate
are helpful for approaching this.
In the first place, it is well-known that
this debate does not turn on the truth
of determinism as such. Determinism
is the idea that every event is
determined by fixed causal laws. Yet it
may well be that every event is
somehow random in origin. One
interpretation of quantum physics
claims that causal laws are the
product of statistical regularities,
while these regularities stem from a
near infinite number of random
events. So far as the human will is
concerned, this makes no difference. If
my conduct is the product of chance,
this makes me no more responsible for
it than does its being generated by
causal laws. The point is that if I am to
be held responsible, then I must
control my conduct – not causal laws,
nor mere chance, nor some particular
combination of the two.
Second, the free will debate bears a
disquieting similarity to an older
controversy. In medieval philosophy it
used to be asked how God’s
omniscience – his knowledge of
everything that has happened and will
happen – could be reconciled with our
being subject to his moral judgment
(that is, being sent to heaven or to
hell). If God knows what we will do
then this seems to imply that it is
already decided whether we will act
well or badly. And this, in turn,
suggests that it makes no sense to
punish or reward us. Theologians
developed various doctrines to
overcome this difficulty, but few
sound convincing to modern ears –
perhaps because the problem itself is
no longer a live one, even for most
believers. However that may be, it is
interesting that many modern versions
of the debate seem to take at least one
of the planks of Christian theology for
granted: that individuals have wills
that can be bad or good, usually now
expressed by philosophers in terms of
people’s ‘blameworthiness’ or (less
often) ‘praiseworthiness.’
In this way, the modern American
philosopher Joel Feinberg ironically
referred to ‘a moral bank account’
that we carry through life, which sums
up our moral credits and debits in a
single figure (1970: 20). Whether or
not such an ‘account’ makes sense, it
is at least clear that the idea of ‘the
will’ is by no means self-explanatory. 
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For Kant, as we shall see, it was
obvious that all my choices can be
summed up in a single moral
evaluation, whether I have a ‘good’ or
‘bad’ will. Kant is equivocal, however,
as to whether only God might make
this evaluation, or whether human
beings might also form reasonable
opinions on the matter. But especially
if we take the point of view of mutual,
human accountability, it is far from
obvious why we should believe any
such single evaluation to be possible,
or what role this evaluation might play
in our individual or collective lives.
Certainly, we usually praise and blame
in terms of particular actions and
particular vices and virtues – not a
good or bad will.
Third, this way of framing the issues
creates a gulf between the conduct of
normal moral agents (adult human
beings of sound mind) and the
conduct of other creatures – animals
and children. At some stage of
evolution, and at some stage toward
maturity, certain animals become
‘free,’ whereas before they had all been
‘determined’ in their conduct.
Although it is grossly implausible that
there are no relevant moral differences
between the other animals, children,
and human adults, it is no more
plausible that the free will simply pops
into existence at a certain stage of
human development. Within a
Christian framework this issue was
less problematic: human beings, and
only human beings, have souls.
Thinkers have always been aware that
animals can show profound care and
concern for one another, but this poses
philosophical difficulties given our
awareness of evolutionary continuities
and the fact that the Christian idea of
the soul is no longer something we
can take for granted. More than this,
within Christianity the moral demands
upon adults could be interpreted in
terms of obedience to God-given laws.
Yet in the modern world demands for
obedience are those we make of
children. Adults are expected to obey
certain basic rules, but we also expect
something more – a sense of
responsibility that involves judgment
and initiative. Despite all this,
however, we tend to think there is
something sufficiently distinctive
about human action, so that many
non-religious people find the idea of
free will plausible, and almost
everyone assumes that only (mature?)
human beings can be responsible for
their actions.
Taking the last three points together
generates a further point. If the idea of
the will is complex, and there is no
straightforward moral dividing line
between children and adults, between
humans and other animals – together,
these ideas suggest that a ‘will’ is not
something we all straightforwardly
‘have.’ In other words: it is implausible
that all adult humans have the same
capacities, all to the same extent, that
are involved in controlling action. One
way of retaining the idea of the will
might be to think of it as the bundle of
capacities that are needed to control
action in the light of moral concerns,
these capacities being set only at such
a level that all adult human beings of
sound mind really seem to possess
them. But two points need to be kept
in mind about such a strategy. First, it
remains the case that people will vary
in how far they possess their
capacities, and this variation will
largely be a product of upbringing and
natural qualities – that is, not
something within an individual’s own
control. Second, the sort of ultimate
control over one’s moral character
supposed in Kant’s or any other ‘free
will’ account is unlikely to be
vindicated in this way.
For an analysis of the basic set of
capacities needed for moral action,
philosophers continue to go back to an
ancient account of moral
responsibility. The terms of the free
will debate are new, arising with the
birth of modern science, and the
theological debate about free will
arises only with Christian thought. But
the question of responsibility for
action has always been known to
philosophers, and the most famous
discussion of when people can be
praised and blamed for their actions
remains Aristotle’s. Many have noticed
that Aristotle and his contemporaries
saw no need to talk about
responsibility in terms of free will.
Aristotle asks whether acts are
voluntary, and whether we attribute
them to a person or to other factors.
Some have ascribed this way of
framing the issues to a lack of moral or
scientific sophistication on the part of
the ancient Greeks. However, a
number of modern philosophers, most
prominently Bernard Williams and
Martha Nussbaum, have suggested
that an Aristotelian account is actually
more coherent and sophisticated than
those typical of modern philosophy –
and, indeed, more coherent than our
modern, ‘common sense’ intuitions
about moral responsibility.
Aristotle assumes that we are
responsible for our actions (so that
others can reasonably praise or blame
or punish us), and proceeds by
pointing to various conditions that
lessen or cancel this responsibility. He
discusses force of events, threats and
coercion, ignorance, intoxication and
bad character. (He also remarks on the
continuities and differences between
children’s agency and that of normal16




adults in ways that illuminate our
practices of responsibility, a point I do
not consider here.) Taken together, his
account shows the basic elements
involved in being a person who can
reasonably be praised or blamed.
The first limitation upon voluntary
action that Aristotle discusses is force
of circumstances. His well-known
example concerns a ship caught in a
storm; the sailors must throw goods
overboard if the ship is not to sink (NE
1110a). In this case the action is not
fully voluntary, and we would not
blame the sailors for their actions.
(Nor, of course, would we blame the
storm: the undesirable consequence,
the loss of the goods, must be chalked
off as the result of natural events, for
which no one is responsible.) Note
that such cases are extreme examples
of the force of necessity under which
we always live – we are always
constrained in our actions by natural
facts, although we only tend to notice
this when the constraint is sudden or
unexpected.
In fact, it tends to be the interference
of other people which causes us the
most grief – and which really causes
problems for responsibility
attributions. Such interference can
take many forms, but its paradigmatic
forms are coercion and manipulation.
Regarding coercion, Aristotle’s
judgment is balanced. It depends on
what action my coercer is demanding
of me, and what threats he makes. 
Some actions are so heinous that we
should be blamed for doing them,
whatever we are threatened with (and
whatever blame also attaches to our
coercer) – thus Aristotle dismisses the
idea that a man might be ‘compelled’
to kill his mother (NE 1110a). This
makes it clear that a central issue at
stake in attributions of responsibility is
the expectations that people have of
one another. There are some forms of
coercion we do not usually expect
people to resist, but there are also
some sorts of action that we think
people should never undertake,
regardless of such factors. In such
cases praise and blame are clearly
working to clarify and reinforce these
expectations – in other words, they
provide for a form of moral education.
Aristotle does not comment on
manipulation, where other people
support us in a false view of our
circumstances. But he does discuss
ignorance of these circumstances, and
how it undermines our responsibility.
If we are ignorant of who someone is,
for example – as was Oedipus, who did
not know that the old man obstructing
him was actually his father – we may
commit heinous acts we would
otherwise abhor – thus Oedipus
committed patricide, killing his own
father. For Aristotle, such actions are
not to be blamed (at least, when the
ignorance is not itself culpable and the
killing was otherwise justified). 
What decides good or bad character is
how a person reacts when he finds out
the truth – if we fail to regret our
deeds, then we can certainly be
blamed, even if the original choice was
justifiable. Among other things,
Aristotle makes it clear that our praise
and blame is often not about an
individual act, but about the character
of the person who acted.
17
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Importantly, it is not every form of
ignorance that excuses. Moral
knowledge is very different from
factual knowledge. What if a man did
not know murder was wrong? Would
this make his murders morally
innocent? Aristotle says not: there are
certain things we can and do expect
people to know – above all, basic
moral truths such as the wrongness of
murder. But this knowledge is not as
straightforward as it might appear: it
must include a fairly good capacity to
judge which sorts of killing count as
murder. Nazi bureaucrat Adolf
Eichmann organised the killing of
thousands, without a sense of its
wrongness. Aristotle is clear: such
moral ignorance, an inability or failure
to judge, excuses no adult. Eichmann
should be held responsible for murder.
But why should moral ignorance not
excuse, when factual ignorance does?
We must recognise that moral
knowledge is actually rather different
from factual knowledge. If a person is
morally ignorant it is his whole
character, his lasting ability to judge
and act well that is impaired – and
presumably very difficult to set right.
Isolated errors in factual knowledge,
on the other hand, can be easily
corrected. So long as we are
subsequently able to recognise and
regret what we have done, factual
mistakes involve no lasting corruption
of character.
Still, if a person is morally ignorant it
follows that they are unable to choose
well; and Aristotle concedes that
many people of settled bad character
– be they morally ignorant or
otherwise – can no longer choose to
act well. Does this mean that blame is
incoherent or misplaced? He claims
not. Even if the vicious person cannot
now choose to act otherwise, there
was a time when her vices were not
fixed, when she could have chosen not
to be vicious. Therefore, Aristotle says,
she can be blamed. This is neat but
rather unconvincing. Aristotle is
famous for emphasising the
importance of good upbringing and
habituation, and presumably many
vices are formed in childhood, before
people have formed capacities for
deliberating reasonably. Indeed, many
vices undercut the capacity for
rational deliberation. So it is a clear
implication of Aristotle’s own account
that the badly brought up person may
never be in a position to choose not to
be vicious. Note, further, that this
unconvincing move represents
Aristotle at his most Kantian: blame is
justified by reference to control, to a
‘could have done otherwise’ – even
when his own account of character
formation suggests that such control
may well never have existed.
It is also interesting that many vices
take the form of moral ignorance – of
not knowing that certain things are
wrong or failing to recognise that
certain actions represent some sort of
wrong-doing. (This is often a failure
only with regard to one’s own actions:
Bishop Butler once observed how
common it is for people to condemn
others for the vices they themselves
are most notorious for!) The difficulty
is that the vicious person cannot, or
will not, see her own vices as such – in
which case she is in no position to
‘take control’ and will see no reason to
act differently in the future. But this
does not mean that we have no reason
to blame her, most obviously because
we might hope that blame will help
educate her, morally speaking.
What are we to say, though, where a
person seems incorrigible – quite
settled in some particular vice, either
because she cannot understand the
criticism or because she is unable to
alter her character or habits? (In real
life it’s often somewhere in between:
‘Yes, I know I shouldn’t behave like
that, but I can’t help it, and it’s really
not as bad as all that.’) Such cases are
very common, and – unless we
suppose that they are not morally
deplorable – seem to undermine the
modern, Kantian assumption that
blame must relate only to conduct
under our control. Clearly, if we think
a character trait is really beyond
alteration, by us or by the person
concerned, our blaming won’t involve
an attempt to reason with the person
we condemn. But our condemnation
might have another rationale, for
example, to clarify what sort of
standards we expect of others. And it
is clear that praise often has this
rationale, too: a virtuous person might
be quite unable to do certain things –
commit cruelty, for example.
In sum, Aristotle’s account is not
entirely self-consistent. Generally his
focus is upon the qualities of
character revealed by acts, in terms of
our overall moral expectations, and it
is these that responsibility attributions
attend to. However, he sometimes
suggests that bad qualities are to be
blamed because they are, or were,
subject to choice, even though this
quasi-Kantian claim is not really
supportable. Despite this, philosophers
have returned to his account again
and again to illuminate the main
ingredients of responsible agency:
• The capacity to respond to others’
censure and encouragement,
whether expressed emotionally (eg,
as resentment), institutionally (eg,
as punishment), or in the various
forms of praise and blame.
• The capacity to exercise deliberate,
sustained control of one’s conduct.
One reason why young children are
not responsible agents is their
inability to sustain control over
time, partly owing to a lack of
18
Two approaches to Moral Responsibility Garrath Williams
emotional self-understanding. (That
we do praise and blame children,
however, emphasises the educative
and encouraging role that praise
and blame can play, both in
developing such control and in
inculcating shared moral standards.)
• A reasonable grasp of how actions
impinge on others and how they are
socially understood – that is, of our
mutual moral expectations.
Taken together, these capacities allow
us to participate in forms of mutual
accountability, whereby we inculcate
and to some extent enforce shared
standards of action.
This list may not be comprehensive,
but it serves to illustrate the
underlying point of an Aristotelian
account: moral responsibility seems to
rest on these sort of fairly basic
capacities, which do not seem to
demand any strong metaphysical
elaboration. Indeed, if we approach
the matter this way, the puzzle seems
to be inverted. Not, ‘how might free
will and determinism be reconciled?’;
rather, ‘why should we feel there is a
metaphysical issue at all?’ It is to this
question, why so many people feel
that metaphysical issues are involved
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[Responsibility]
In the last decade or so consciousness
has once again become a focus of
interest in philosophy of mind, but so
far sleep has barely been mentioned.
Sleep raises special issues for any
theory of consciousness. By this I am
not referring to dreams and the
sceptical difficulties that surround
them – those difficulties always
attract at least a moderate amount of
attention. I am referring to dreamless
sleep, the dark episodes of the mind
that seem to leave no trace in us. In
the seventeenth century there was
lively controversy over the nature of
dreamless sleep and philosophers
attempted to incorporate their
understanding of sleep into a more
general view of the mind and
consciousness. Here we will explore
and contrast three philosophical
accounts of sleep – those of Descartes,
Locke and Leibniz – before assessing
some of the problems and insights the
debate about sleep provides for an
understanding of consciousness.
It was for René Descartes and his
followers that sleep first reared its
head as a philosophical problem in the
modern period. In the Meditations
Descartes found his mind to be
essentially a ‘thinking thing’, res
cogitans. To say that the essence – or
principal attribute – of the mind was
thinking, meant also to say that the
mind could not lose this attribute and
still continue to exist. The existence of
the mind without a thought was no
more conceivable than of a piece of
matter without extension. Since
Descartes used the term ‘thinking’ to
refer to all conscious states, this
meant that so long as my mind exists
I must always be conscious, even
during a fainting fit, or in the deepest
sleep. In the Second Meditation
Descartes memorably asserts,
I am, I exist – that is certain. But for
how long? For as long as I am
thinking. For it could be that were I
totally to cease from thinking, I
should totally cease to exist.1
Now, it is true, one option still seems
to remain for Descartes if he wanted
to deny the conclusion that we are
conscious the whole time we are
sleeping. He could take the view that
in sleep the mind stops thinking and
existing and on waking returns to
existence and thought: he might have
opted, that is,  for a pause in the
existence of the mental substance.
After all, it is already a feature of his
system that the human mind is, in
common with all finite substances,
continually conserved in existence by
the action of God, and he asks us to
look upon this conservation as a kind
of continuous recreation. So what
stopped Descartes from saying that
when a mind goes to sleep God takes
a pause before recreating that same
mind on waking? 
It was his doctrine of substance that
closed off the option of the existential
pause. Descartes held the mind to be a
substance, and a substance is a thing
that is able to exist independently of
the activities of all things other than
God. An existential pause during sleep
would mean that (with God’s
connivance) the mind could be
temporarily destroyed by, say, the
action of a sleeping-pill, or the voice
of a certain lecturer, and that it could
be brought back into existence by a
loud noise or a wet flannel. Its
existence would be contingent on the
activities of other finite existences and
it would therefore be quite unfit to
qualify as a substance.
So, taken together, Descartes’
metaphysical doctrines of substance
and essence meant that he had to
commit himself to the controversial
view that even in the deepest sleep we
are really conscious. An obvious
objection immediately suggests itself:
why, if we are always conscious, do
most of us think that we are not so in
dreamless sleep? Why is deep sleep
looked upon by practically all people,
outside Cartesian circles, as a gap in
mental activity? Descartes tried to
meet this objection, when it was put
forward by his critic and adversary
Pierre Gassendi, in the following way: 
So long as the mind is joined to the
body, then in order for it to
remember thoughts which it had in
the past, it is necessary for some20
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traces of them to be imprinted on
the brain; it is by turning to these
[…] that the mind remembers. So is
it really surprising if the brain of […]
a man in a deep sleep, is unsuited to
receive these traces? 2
During dreamless sleep, his argument
runs, the mind can lay down no new
memories. Thus, on waking up we are
unable to recall any of the thinking
that was in fact going on while we
were sleeping. In fact, even if we are
woken in the midst of a dreamless
sleep, we will still be convinced that
we were conscious of nothing: our
brains, the physical organs in which
memories are stored, do not retain,
even for a split-second, the thoughts
in question. 
But why this memory-failure?
Descartes seems to hold that it is the
result of the soul withdrawing – so to
speak – from the body (and in
particular from the brain).3 The
consciousness that goes on in this
state of withdrawal, or retirement,
does not engage the physical
mechanisms of memory in the brain –
it wafts by without being recorded. In
fact, ‘memory-failure’ may be a
misleading phrase for what happens
here: the thoughts of the sleeper never
even enter the memory and therefore
there is really no possibility of recall
succeeding. The experiences are just
not available for recollection.
Descartes’ understanding of sleep as
the conscious mind retiring, or
withdrawing, from the brain finds
explicit expression only in the reply to
Gassendi that we have just mentioned.
And here there is just one paragraph in
which the tone is somewhat
speculative. Other Cartesians,
however, developed the position found
in embryo in their master. Nicolas
Malebranche, for example, offered two
different accounts of why there was
non-recollection. The first adds to
Descartes’ own view. Malebranche
explains the suspension of memory by
the fact that only ‘pure intellection’
takes place, and that such thought –
which deals with the abstract
concepts of maths, logic and
metaphysics – has no imagery
associated with it and therefore,
unlike sense and imagination, does not
involve the animal spirits, and thus
leaves no traces in the brain.4 This
shows skilful employment of the
Cartesian doctrine to bring a more
precise understanding of the soul’s
thinking in retirement from the body,
though of course it would be
unappealing to those who were
downright sceptical about the faculty
of pure intellection in the first place.5
Malebranche’s second explanation
departs somewhat from the original
suggestion made by Descartes:
It sometimes happens that we have
so many different thoughts that we
believe we are thinking about
nothing at all. This is seen in the
case of people who fall into a
swoon. The animal spirits, swirling
irregularly in their brain, stir up so
many traces that no one of them is
opened sufficiently to excite a
particular sensation or distinct idea
in the mind. As a result of this, these
people perceive so many things
simultaneously that they perceive
nothing distinct – which leads them
to think they have perceived
nothing.6
Here we can more legitimately talk
about ‘memory-failure’. What
Malebranche seems to be describing is
thinking that is so fragmented and
confused that it doesn’t stick in the
mind. Whatever traces are laid down
they are too indistinct to be the
subject of recall. As a result the
subject concludes that he was not
thinking at all in the episodes in
question. In this second explanation
Malebranche comes close to the view
of Leibniz which we shall examine in a
moment. But it is Malebranche’s first
explanation, in which the soul
contemplates ideas of pure
intellection in retirement from the
body, that is most quintessentially
Cartesian and which was generally
recognised as the orthodox Cartesian
view of sleep; so I shall refer to the
Cartesian view, put forward in
Descartes’ replies and in
Malebranche’s later Recherche, as the
retirement view.
Now, it is hardly surprising that the
Cartesian view should be subject to
the sharpest criticism by an empiricist
such as John Locke. In the first section
of the second book of his Essay
Concerning Human Understanding
Locke launches a swingeing attack on
the Cartesian position. He makes his
first and most important move against
the Cartesians by treating their thesis
(that the mind always thinks) quite
independently of its metaphysical
background – the definition of mind as
res cogitans, the doctrines of essence
and substance. For Locke such a thesis
was, like any other sweeping
statement about the actual content of
our minds, an empirical hypothesis.
And, as such, it went against all the
evidence and was grossly improbable.
Anyone will tell you that they spent
much of last night without thinking at
all. If metaphysics leads us to deny this
commonplace, Locke implied, then so
much the worse for metaphysics.
Locke held, broadly speaking, that we
should accept the verdict of sleepers
themselves that dreamless sleep
constitutes a gap in thinking – the
mind does not retire to contemplate
ideas of pure intellection in some
phantom realm, it simply blacks-out.
Let us call this the black-out view.
Now Locke thinks that he is on
particularly strong ground when it
comes to hypotheses about sleep – he
takes it that there is no higher
authority for whether a person is
thinking or not than the consciousness
of that person themselves. The
common-man is in a much better
position to know what he did or did
not think about last night than an
armchair hypothesis-monger. 
Some of what Locke says against the
Cartesians is in a satirical vein. At one
point he declares that ‘every drowsy
Nod shakes their Doctrine’.7 But Locke
makes more subtle moves too. His
dissatisfaction with the view that the
mind is thinking throughout dreamless
sleep but remembers nothing, leads
him to the question of personal
identity. Who is this person that is
thinking in me while I sleep? It is not I,
myself, he argues, because there is no
continuity with my present thoughts.
Memory, as Locke makes more explicit
in the chapter on personal identity,8 is
constitutive of the self as a
continuing, reflecting person. If there
are periods of thinking in me that I can
have no conceivable access to when
awake, then the thinking in question is
really that of another person. If, say,
Socrates asleep is busy thinking, but
remembers nothing on waking, then
this night-time thinking no more
concerns Socrates than does the
‘Happiness, or Misery of a Man in the
Indies, whom he knows not’.9
Generally, Locke holds that it is a
much more probable hypothesis that
we are without thoughts in dreamless
sleep. But realising that he cannot
definitively refute the Cartesian
hypothesis, he is content to at least
point out that thoughts deemed to
take place in sleep do not belong to
the waking self.
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In Descartes and Locke we have seen a
fairly straightforward contradiction of
opinions – thesis, antithesis. It is
Gottfried Leibniz who, in commenting
on Locke’s Essay, comes up with a
synthesis of the two conflicting
positions. Leibniz’s view of sleep is, in
my opinion, the most promising and
fertile of the three views we are
considering.10
Leibniz begins by agreeing with the
Cartesians that the mind is always
thinking, even in dreamless sleep. Just
as there is always motion, however
imperceptible, in bodies, so there are
confused and indistinct thoughts
continually passing through the mind
of the sleeper. However, Locke is also
right to say that there no conscious
thinking goes on in sleep. The thinking
in question is unconscious. It is
unconscious by virtue of being
unfocused, fragmented and
unattended to. Leibniz therefore drops
the major assumption of both the
Cartesians and Lockeans that thinking
is by its very nature conscious. He saw
that if he allowed unconscious
thoughts, or perceptions, then an
acceptable third way between the
opposing views of sleep opened up. In
Leibniz’s terminology ‘perceptions’
occur in sleep, but not ‘apperception’ –
his term for self-conscious thought. 
These unconscious perceptions he
called petites perceptions, or ‘minute
perceptions’ and he held that they
were too faint and indistinct to be the
subject of awareness. Let us call
Leibniz’s view of sleep the confusion
view.
Leibniz’s reasons for arriving at this
synthesis were manifold and he drew
on metaphysical principles, just as
Descartes did, as well as on empirical
observation, like Locke. Among the
empirical reasons, two stand out,
appealing to the phenomena of
waking and falling asleep respectively.
In the first of these Leibniz notes that
it is sometimes easier to wake up a
sleeper than at other times. It is
natural, he argues, to treat this as
being because someone sleeping
lightly has more sense of what is going
on around him. His minute perceptions
grow into larger, conscious ones more
readily. If this is so, the implication is
that there are degrees of being asleep
– a continuum from waking to the
deepest slumber. And this continuum
is to be understood in terms of the
relative distinctness of the minute
perceptions in the different stages of
sleep. Secondly, Leibniz notes that a
good way of getting oneself to sleep is
to allow one’s thoughts to wander. We
all know how thinking about a
problem with too much
singlemindedness stops us dropping
off. By letting one’s attention be
divided between many perceptions,
one may induce sleep. It then seems
natural to treat the induced state as
unattentive, unfocused thought. 
Thus the confusion view has the virtue
of suggesting that there is a continuity
between extreme tiredness and the
process of falling asleep on the one
hand and sleep itself on the other.
Leibniz goes on to draw a comparison
between sleep and the periphery of
consciousness. In any waking
experience there are many perceptions
that are too unfocused to be
consciously registered. To use an
example not in Leibniz, but which is in
harmony with his thought: if the clock
in a room stops ticking, we ‘hear’ the
silence it leaves. This implies that
although we were not conscious of the
ticking of the clock, we must have
been perceiving it in some
unconscious way all the time,
otherwise we could not notice its
absence. In sleep such unregistered
perceptions become the sole contents
of the mind. In other words the
periphery of consciousness is a kind of
partial sleep that becomes more
general when we are drowsy and
finally takes over completely when we
drop off. As Leibniz puts it, it is as
though we had been ‘selectively
asleep’ with regard to objects at the
periphery of consciousness, ‘and when
we withdraw our attention from
everything all together, the sleep
becomes general’.11
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Three well-defined and contending
views of the mind’s activity during
sleep emerge from Descartes’ original
discussion:
(i) The retirement view of Descartes
and Malebranche. The soul is
consciously thinking throughout
dreamless sleep, but no new
memories are laid down because
the thinking is disembodied ‘pure
intellection’.
(ii) The black-out view. Locke’s more
common-sense contention that
the mind simply does not think in
dreamless sleep and is therefore
quite unconscious.
(iii) The confusion view. Leibniz’s view
that the mind continuously thinks
in sleep but, because the
perceptions involved are too
confused and fragmented, it does
not do so consciously.
I will now say something about how
these views, and the reasons used to
support them, relate to the problem of
consciousness. 
Firstly the retirement view raises a
problem for the most obvious and
popular definition of consciousness
which is favoured by, for example,
John Searle: 
‘consciousness’ refers to those
states of sentience and awareness
that typically begin when we awake
from a dreamless sleep and continue
until we go to sleep again, or fall
into a coma or die or otherwise
become ‘unconscious’.12
This is a definition by contrast:
consciousness is what goes on when
we are not sleeping, comatose etc.
One problem with such a definition is
that it relies on the reader not being a
Cartesian. For, on Descartes’
conception, the mind is permanently
conscious (even after death), and so
there is no contrast to be had with
states of unconsciousness. Searle
would surely reply that even for the
Cartesian, it seems as if we are
unconscious during sleep because of
the gap in our memory and that that is
enough to get the contrastive
definition off the ground. But this
would be to imply that any memory
gap will do the job of making a
contrast with consciousness just as
well – I cannot remember what I was
doing on the afternoon of June 29th,
1987 for example, so that would be an
example of my being unconscious. This
brings us to the crux of the problem.
There seems to be no way of imagining
unconsciousness that distinguishes it
from a blank in the memory, a point
we have seen exploited by the
Cartesians. This means that a
contrastive definition of consciousness
is quite different from, say, a definition
of light by contrast with darkness. It
makes sense to define light as the
negation of darkness and vice versa,
because we have experience of both
(for darkness just turn out the
lights). With consciousness and
unconsciousness the experience is
inevitably one-sided.
A second important question is raised
by Locke’s critique of the Cartesian
position that attributes consciousness
to us without the faculty of retaining
our thoughts, even in the shortest
term. Locke describes this as ‘a very
useless sort of thinking’. He continues,
the  Soul in such a state of thinking,
does very little, if at all, to excel that
of a Looking-glass, which constantly
receives variety of Images, or Ideas,
but retains none; they disappear and
vanish, and there remain no
footsteps of them; the Looking-glass
is never the better for such Ideas,
nor the Soul for such Thoughts.
Locke comes close here to saying that
thinking without memory is not really
thinking, any more than the passing
images on a mirror are perceptions.
Just as someone could not talk
meaningfully if they were quite
lacking in short-term memory – they
would forget what they had said from
one word to the next – so one could
not think successfully if what one was
thinking about dropped out of one’s
mind the very instant it was thought. I
suspect one should go further and say
that consciousness itself is not
possible without memory. In order to
be conscious, I must be conscious of
something. But what could be the
object of my consciousness if none of
my thoughts could be retained for any
duration. Could I be conscious of a
triangle, for example, if when I
thought about one angle I forgot
about the other two and, indeed,
about the sides and everything else?
Would I even be able to think of the
angle under these circumstances?
Even if I concentrated on just one
thing continuously, I would not be
aware of doing so without memory,
since each instant I would have
forgotten what I was thinking of the
instant before. Mentation would be a
succession of vanishing points: it
would be a blind-play of imagery, less
even than a dream, one would like to
say, paraphrasing Kant. The faculty of
memory is internal to consciousness: it
is not an optional extra.
A third point at which this debate
about sleep touches on the question of
consciousness is seen in Leibniz’s
comparison between sleep and the
periphery of consciousness. As we
have seen, for Leibniz the unregistered
peripheral perceptions, which always
attend our consciousness in waking
life, become the sole contents of the
mind in sleep. In other words the
periphery of consciousness is a kind of24
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partial sleep that becomes general
when we drop off. Leibniz’s view here
is important because it has the
advantage of understanding sleep not
as a special phenomenon which calls
for special treatment (as in Descartes
and Locke), but as a case continuous
with what is going on beyond the
borders of our conscious perceptions
throughout waking experience. Sleep
is fitted into a larger whole. An
explanation that is ad hoc is always
suspicious. It suggests that the terms
of the explanation are artificial,
having been invented specially for the
case in question (ad hoc means ‘for
this’). But there is no ‘ad hocery’ about
Leibniz’s explanation: it accounts not
only for mental activity during sleep,
but also for a class of (peripheral)
mental activity throughout waking
life. Ideally, a theory of consciousness
and a theory of sleep should be cut
from the same cloth in this way.
Charles University, Prague.
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We are familiar with the notion of
trust.  Trusting another person is part
of what it is to stand in relations of
love, friendship and co-operation.
Trust is central to the faith
characteristic of the membership of a
religion.  Trust is presupposed in the
anguish of betrayal.  It is natural to
think that either someone is
acquainted with trust or else she is in
some profound sense deficient or
lacking in a form of knowledge vital
for a full sense of humanity.  That
deficiency, moreover, is not a source of
criticism but of sympathy.  For, an
ignorance of or inability ever to trust
is to be forced to endure a stunted,
curtailed kind of engagement with a
world of other persons.  Trust is both
commonplace and vital.  In its ubiquity
we perhaps lose sight of its
importance until we find ourselves
unable to act because we cannot trust
the other(s) now or because our trust
leads us to harm.
There is, then, one way at least in
which there is absolutely nothing
puzzling about trust.  People do for the
most part stand in trusting relations.
Taking myself to be typical in this
respect I trust certain others and I am
in turn trusted by others.   The puzzle
arises when we turn to the question of
why and how trust is possible.  When
a person trusts another or others she is
displaying a confidence in them.
Intuitively, we call this attitude trust
when the confidence outstrips or
outreaches the grounds which one
might reasonably or ordinarily regard
as giving rise to that confidence.  On
an influential view of human nature it
is difficult to understand why such an
attitude to others would arise as a
widespread phenomenon.  Strip
human nature to its essential elements
and we see that we are rational,
maximising agents ultimately driven
by self-interest.1 To trust another is
to expose oneself to the risk of
betrayal; to be trusted by another and
to act in a trustworthy fashion may be
to forego an opportunity to seize
something to one’s own immediate
advantage.  The puzzle is then, first,
why we trust and why it is widespread
if we are driven by our own self-
interested concerns.  A second aspect
of the puzzle is whether our intuitions
about the nature of trust ought to be
taken at face value.  Perhaps with
respect to this second part you may
not have any obvious intuitions; or
now you turn to reflect upon them
they appear confused or uncertain; or
perhaps you are firm and confident in
your intuitions – but why?  That is the
call to conceptual analysis; to get
clearer about what we mean by a term
and when it is apt to deploy it.2 If we
are to understand love, friendship and
the bases of social co-operation we
had better attempt to elucidate the
nature and role of trust in the social
world.  
In the present paper I cannot hope to
undertake that ambitious task.
Instead I shall attempt to adumbrate
one part of any response to the
problem of determining why trust is
possible.  I consider what we mean by
the term trust. 
A typical dictionary definition
identifies trust as ‘reliance on and
confidence in the truth, worth,
reliability etc. of a person or thing’. 3
On this view trust is seen as a kind of
reliance.  For one person to trust
another is for her to believe that the
other can be relied upon.  That is, if I
am to trust some other person, then I
must have some way of assessing the
risk of their failing to act in the
appropriate fashion.  The fundamental
problem is one of overcoming
ignorance about how others will act.
In some circumstances there may be
no real difficulty.  When the robber
has a gun pressed against the victim’s
head there is little scope for doubt
about how the victim will respond to
the request to hand over her money.
The robber can rely on the victim.  For
trust to be possible amongst people,
then, there has to be some basis on
which they can regard each other as
being sufficiently reliable.  The
difficulties that arise when we cannot
be confident in the reliable
performance of others are modelled in
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Hobbes’ famous account of the state
of nature.    In the absence of an
effective sovereign authority our
nature brings about a situation of
instability.  As Hobbes observes: 
So that in the nature of man, we
find three principal causes of
quarrel. First, competition; secondly,
diffidence; thirdly, glory.   The first
maketh men invade for gain; the
second, for safety; and the third, for
reputation. The first use violence, to
make themselves masters of other
men's persons, wives, children, and
cattle; the second, to defend them;
the third, for trifles, as a word, a
smile, a different opinion, and any
other sign of undervalue, either
direct in their persons or by
reflection in their kindred, their
friends, their nation, their
profession, or their
name…Whatsoever therefore is
consequent to a time of war, where
every man is enemy to every man,
[there is] continual fear, and danger
of violent death; and the life of man,
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and
short.4
The problem is plain.  We need to co-
operate in order to establish some
degree of stability.  Yet, how in the
state of nature can we establish the
degree of assurance that is surely
required in order for individuals to co-
operate? How can we come to trust
each other?  Hobbes approach is
instructive because he is not
supposing that we take the state of
nature seriously as a historical
situation from which we emerged into
a society organised through the
institutions of the state.  Rather, we
are presented with a thought
experiment whose aim to render vivid
the problems we (as socialised
moderns) would encounter should
there be no state.  Those problems
arise out of our very nature, a nature
explicated (to put matters crudely) in
terms of the maximising rational
agent model.  No one can rely on
agreements to mutual restraint of
competition which they might make
with others.  For no one has any
reason to assume that others will keep
their word
If a covenant be made, wherein
neither of the parties perform now,
but trust one another; in the
condition of meer nature...upon any
reasonable suspicion, it is void.  (But
if there be a common power set over
them both, with right and force
sufficient to compel performance, it
is not void.)  For he that performeth
first, has no assurance the other will
perform after, because the bonds of
words are too weak to bridle men's
ambition, avarice anger, and other
passions, without the fear of some
coercive power; which in the
condition of meer nature, where all
men are equal, and judges of the
justness of their own fears, cannot
be supposed.  And therefore he that
performeth first, does but betray
himself to his enemy; contrary to
the right (he can never abandon) of
defending his life and means of
living.5
The answer is that the establishment
(or existence) of an effective sovereign
power will put in place the potentially
coercive framework that will enable
individuals to rely on one another (for
the most part): if you fail to keep to
your agreements then the law provides
the sanctions to punish you. I can rely
on the self-interest of my counterpart
and so come to the reasonable belief
that she will keep to her word.  The
fact that there are sanctions
constraining what it is in your interest
to do cannot rule out the possibility
that you will cheat.  Assuming the
sanctions are real and you are rational
I can judge that you are likely to act
reliably.
Now, one might object that there is
more to trust than simply coming to a
judgement as to whether someone
else can be relied upon to keep their
word.  For on a simple reliance model
of trust it seems that trusting
someone becomes a function of 27
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assessing the probabilities.  Thus trust
would be:
a certain level of subjective
probability with which an agent
assesses that another agent or
group of agents will perform a
particular action, both before he can
monitor such action (or
independently of his capacity ever
to be able to monitor it) and in a
context in which it affects his own
action.6
The difficulty in regarding trust as a
belief about the reliability of others is
in how to explain how we form such
beliefs.  In the case of the robber he
has very good inductive grounds for
relying on certain patterns of
behaviour by victims, but this is in part
precisely why that relationship does
not look like the kind one can describe
in terms of trust.  Individuals trust one
another under circumstances of
uncertainty and risk.  Trust is a
response to a form of ignorance, an
epistemological shortfall, that arises in
certain circumstances.  For example,
imagine a Jew fleeing a Nazi death
camp who comes to a church.  He may
trust a priest to assist him.  There is
clearly a risk in exposing himself to the
goodwill of the priest for in the
circumstances the escapee simply
lacks the information that would
enable him to come to a judgement on
whether the priest is sympathetic to
the Nazi regime or has other pressing
reasons that would prevent him from
offering help.  Nonetheless, we surely
want to say that trust can be placed in
the priest because of who he is and
what that entails.  Of course, trusting
someone cannot count as a guarantee
of their performance.  Trust has in this
sense an asymmetrical quality.  It
flows from one person to the other,
awaiting reciprocation but vulnerable
to abuse.  That is the risk.   If I know
enough about the situation to reliably
assess the probability of someone
performing, then I would appear not to
need to trust them.  I could simply rely
on them.  In a world in which there are
psychics capable of reading minds one
would surely be amazed to hear them
talking of any need to trust other
people.  The puzzle is not how I can go
about gathering enough information
to do the sums working out the
reliability of others, but what can
justify or explain taking a risk on the
goodwill of another when that
information is not to hand. 
Well, one might note that Hobbes has
just the right kind answer.  We cannot
trust each other left to our own
devices.  However, establish a power to
force us to act decently (this is not
Hobbes’ way of putting matters) and
we have just the form of assurance
required to overcome the reluctance
to take a risk on others.  The difficulty
with this approach is that it may just
be at odds with how we think about
trust.  This is not to say that we should
just accept our countervailing
intuitions, but we ought to explore
why an objection arises and whether
we should stick with our intuitions or
revise them.
The intuition I have in mind about our
everyday understanding of trust is that
it is distinct from mere reliance.  The
situations in which we employ the
terms are not co-extensive.  An
account of trust just in terms of
reliance may also appear to just
collapse the distinction between
reliance and trust.  If to trust another
is simply to rely on them, then there is
an open ended range of ways in which
I might properly judge them to be
reliable in the circumstances in
question.  The grounds on which I
determine the reliability of the other
might include their stupidity.  They can
be relied upon to help me move flat
because they cannot see how I
regularly exploit their goodwill.  Or, I
might be able to rely on the co-
operation of someone because I am
her boss.  I know she is ambitious and
she will go to great lengths to impress
me.  
Consider once again the attitude of
the fleeing Jew to the priest.  We can
hypothesise another situation of
flight.  A group of hardened criminals
have escaped from prison.  As they
dash from the prison grounds they
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come to a wide and dangerous looking
river, the howling guards and their
dogs hot on their trail.  Luckily the
prisoners happen upon a robust
rowing boat.7 In order to effect their
escape they must co-operate in the
rowing of the boat and in attempting
to navigate the frightening currents of
the river.  As rational, self-interested
individuals with a common goal each
of them can rely on the others to do
their bit.  In our story it is clear to each
of them that his own singular goal is
only achievable through co-operating
with the others, and each knows that
each of the others knows this to be the
case.8 We should say that the prisoners
can rely on one another to do their
part in escaping the guards.  Once they
have effected an escape, or at least
one of them believes this to be the
case, we have no reason to expect
continued co-operation in the absence
of some new external pressure.  It is
simply discordant with the way in
which we usually apply the concept of
trust to describe the situation as one
in which the prisoners trust one
another.  Or is that simply to beg the
question?  Why ought we not talk of
the prisoners standing in a
relationship of trust? 
The response to this challenge is to
expose within an understanding of
trust some feature that explains why
the prisoners are not (obviously)
trusting each other.  The problem with
the view that trust is reliance is that it
fails to acknowledge that we trust
others, and so see them as reliable,
because we regard them in a certain
way, and furthermore, in trusting them
we are joined with them in a way of
seeing the world.  Our trust arises from
our ways of seeing and interrelating
with others.   To see what we mean by
trust we need to both generate cases
where it appears to be salient to our
understanding of what is going on,
and to think hard about why.
First, trust may involve a willingness to
be exposed to the risk of default by
another because of who they are.
Here one has not made any calculation
about the likelihood of someone not
acting in a certain way.  Rather, the
very thought of such a calculation
does not enter into consideration.
Following Annette Baier’s way of
putting matters trust is the willing
acceptance of vulnerability to harm
that others could inflict, but which we
judge they will not in fact inflict.9
A trusting agent is one who has
willingly accepted that his interests
are exposed to the exercise of the
goodwill of another.
A second feature of trust is that it
involves an attitude or feeling towards
another; it is (in part) constituted by
an emotional state.10 To trust another
is to have an attitude towards them
that has a certain feel.  The way
trusting feels does not on the face of
things appear to be like the way being
in pain or despair is.  Nonetheless, the
way it feels to trust can be expressed
in terms of the attitude of ‘optimism
that the goodwill and competence of
another will extend over the domain
of our interaction with her, together
with the thought that the one trusted
will be directly and favourably moved
by the thought we are counting on
her’.11 That trust has a certain presence
in our psychological state is also
suggested by the sense of ill-ease,
perhaps tension or even distress,
experienced when one realises that
trust is missing.   
Trust is not just a matter of reliance
because when we trust someone it is
our attitude towards them that is
essential in the belief or judgement we
have with regard to their performance.
Trust can be conceived as a complex of
cognitive (belief-based) and affective
(emotion-based) states.  These states
play an important role in securing co-
operative behaviour in the face of risk,
particularly in situations or contexts in
which the extent, degree or probability
of risk is (practically) incalculable.
There is a further element in our
understanding of trust: the idea that
there is a non-instrumental good in
trusting, which we may describe as a
value that is internal to the practice of
trusting.  For I wish to propose that
there is something that is good in
trusting in itself.  That is, there is a
value in standing in relations of trust.   
Thus far I have spoken in terms of one
person trusting another, and played
upon the sense in which trust is
centrally characterised by the 29
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exposure to risk on the part of the
trusting agent.   Any elucidation of the
concept of trust must attempt to cast
light on the conditions in which some
other can be regarded as trustworthy,
and not simply adequately reliable in
the circumstances.    
Of course, by trusting each other we
may be able to achieve through co-
operative action that which would
otherwise have been beyond us acting
individually.  Distinct from the good of
the achievement of that goal is the
value of being a certain way.  That way
is constituted by the very act of
trusting and its component attitudes
and beliefs. When a person trusts
another – and that trust is not the
subject of abuse - she comes to be
assured that there is a commitment
between them, a reciprocal bond upon
which genuine or well-grounded trust
rests and a shared understanding of
the world presupposed in the act of
trusting.  If this is right, then by
trusting we do not simply make
possible the instrumental good of
achieving shared ends or, indeed, of
sustaining relations that are good in
themselves such as friendships.
Rather, by trusting we are engaging in
a practice that is also in itself valuable
and whose value inheres in the very
relationship presupposed in the trust.
Care needs to be taken here in
explaining just what is valuable about
trusting.  Trust can, of course, be
abused.  Sometimes the person
investing trust in another is simply
mistaken or foolish to do so.  If in spite
of all the evidence to the contrary I
trust someone then I look to have
erred.  Trust is a relationship forged in
the absence of reliance determining
reasons, not one that can be sustained
in the face of reasons that ought to
compel me to judge that the other
cannot or will not act as if he regarded
my interests with goodwill.
Sometimes it will be a close call and at
others not so.  For example, if my
friend with a compulsion for goldfish
flesh offers to look after my fish while
I am away, I am a fool to trust him.
Indeed, if I care about the fate of the
fish I am worse than a fool.
Sometimes more than goldfish hang
on our decisions on whether we ought
to place trust another.  In other cases
we are not fools or naïve to place our
trust in others.  Certain of the
relations in which we stand seem to
presuppose trust in.  All we need to
know to take a risk on the other is who
they are – instances of such trusted
parties might include parents,
teachers, priests and lovers.  In virtue
of the relations in which one stands to
them there ought to be trust.  That is,
to be a friend or lover is partly
constituted by bearing the strain of
being an object of trust.  If your
parent, friend or lover asks why they
ought to be trusted, then one may fear
that they just do not grasp the proper
nature of the relationship, or that the
question signals the demise of the
relationship. 
When one person trusts another and
they are justified in doing so the trust
arises because they can understand
each other in the appropriate fashion
for the risk to be taken by the one and
the faith or confidence being
reciprocated in the actions of the
other.   Furthermore, when one is
trusted the response typically extends
beyond simply responding
appropriately in the sense that trust
does not spring forth from a vacuum.
To trust (and be trusted) is part of the
typically complex array of practices
and attitudes through which the
domain of social interaction is
constituted.   On this view trust is to
be understood as a way of regarding
others which is embedded in the
networks of social practices.
Widespread trust is possible because it
is presupposed in our ways of going on
together.  That capacity to trust is as
secure or as vulnerable as those
practices through which relations,
institutions and groups are sustained,
and in particular the capacity of those
practices to withstand the pressures of
critical reflection on the part of those30
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engaged in them and the challenges of
other practices.
Now, to return to the question of the
value of trust.  The value in trust is the
value we enjoy through standing in a
trusting relationship.  Moreover, the
value in trust is objective in the sense
that the good is not a question of how
I feel.  Rather, the relationship both
forged by and constituting the trust
between us, is the source of a good in
virtue of which our lives go (at least
potentially) well.  Trust is presupposed
in the nature of certain relations; that
is, trust is part of what it is to stand
with another(s) in a relationship of
love or friendship.  In standing in these
kinds of relations each of our lives is
enriched.   
My observations on the meaning of
trust do not amount to an argument
that this is how we should indeed
understand that term.  Rather, they
represent an attempt to analyse how
we can think about a concept, and as
such can only represent a fragment of
an  endeavour to examine the nature
of trust.  That enterprise might need to
abandon the attempt to provide a
univocal analysis for the idea of trust
may simply not be a settled term with
a single application across different
domains of discourse.  I shall conclude
the paper by briefly assessing if the
analysis of trust offered meets certain
bare requirements one might expect
from an account of trust. 
According to Jones ‘an adequate
account of trust should be able to
explain at least the following three
fairly obvious facts about trust: that
trust and distrust are contraries but
not contradictories, that trust cannot
be willed, and that trust can give rise
to beliefs that are abnormally resistant
to evidence’.12
The account given accepts that at a
general level distrust is a contrary of
trust.  Bob and Jane may just have no
attitude or distrust towards each other
in the relevant context.  The failure to
trust is not necessarily equivalent to
distrusting, standing in a relation of
pessimism about the goodwill and
motivation of the other.  In some
contexts, though, the failure or
inability to trust may signal distrust.  If
I do not trust my wife when she sets
out her plans for the day then it can
not be explained as lacking a
particular attitude towards her, as
being locked in ‘neutral’.  The thicker
or deeper the relations in which we
stand then, perhaps, the more
compressed becomes the space
between trust and distrust.  
That trust can not be willed seems
right and supported by the account
given.  Emerging from our
interactions, to trust means that one
stands with others and sees the social
world (in the appropriate context) in a
distinctive way.  I might need to decide
whether the grounds for trust are
really present, I might reflect on my
feelings towards the other(s).  Such
considerations impact upon the stance
I take towards the world.  However, I
merely go wrong if I begin to perceive
the world as if I do trust certain
others; that is, if I decide to act as
though I enjoyed the perspective of
one who stands in certain trusting
relationships.  To simply decide – to, as
it were, declare to myself - that I trust
someone may induce in me the beliefs
and feelings associated with trust.
However, their source is not located in
a relationship with the other person,
and those beliefs and emotions are to
be regarded as counterfeit.  This need
not mean that trusting relations are
therefore personal in being proximate
or close in social space or face-to-
face. For I can trust those who I have
never met through the mediating
chains of relations and practices.  So I
may trust the leaders of my faith or
community.  However, to trust in a
way that is appropriately grounded in
the ways in which I am connected or
related to the other I need to be so
joined.  It is not simply down to my act
of will.      
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When individuals trust one another
there is a resistance to accept
evidence that undermines that trust.
Again this is conspicuous where trust
is deep and where it is often
associated with other affective
attitudes.  Bob may soon learn that he
is a cuckold.  Indeed, the evidence of
his wife’s infidelity has been
mounting.  For an outside observer it
appears nearly impossible that he
could have missed so much that was
so obvious.  Yet, Bob trusts his wife
because he loves her.  Because of his
understanding of the relationship in
which they stand – or more accurately,
the relationship in which they once
stood and which he believes they
continue to stand in - he interprets
evidence of his wife’s adultery into
innocence.  When we trust coherence
is brought to part of the world.  That
coherent form serves as a constraint
on how we respond and act and as a
filter through which evidence is
interpreted.  Trust is sometimes
difficult to undermine because we do
not merely have a desire for coherence
and stability.  It is rather that the form
or structure of our world is determined
in large part by the nature of those
relations in which trust is so central.  A
world that is dear to us, familiar and
one that constrains our understanding
is itself threatened by the dissolution
of trust.  Perhaps our resistance to the
evidence against trusting resides in
the living of a kind of life.
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It is the most familiar of scenes:
hitherto confined to a world of
shadows that since childhood he has
been taught constitutes the only
reality, a prisoner is released from his
bonds and compelled to make the
ascent out of the cave and into the
light of immutable truth. It is the
seminal image of the journey of
philosophical enlightenment in the
Western tradition. Summarised thus,
however, it tells only half of Socrates’
story: having undertaken the journey
out of the shadows, the newly
educated philosopher is obliged to
return to the cave and rule in
accordance with the vision of truth
that he has been afforded. Glaucon
has his doubts, but they are assuaged.
The philosopher, he concedes, must
return; ‘there is no one else’ (521d).1
The debate surrounding the
philosopher’s return to the cave is a
constant of Plato scholarship. Why,
having left the cave and witnessed the
form of the good, does the philosopher
forego his new found ‘earthly paradise’
(519c) and undertake the difficult task
of ruling his former fellows? What is
his motivation to return? The purpose
of this essay is to examine Plato’s
answer to this question and its
implications for the argument that is
advanced in both the middle books of
the Republic and, by extension, the
dialogue as a whole. I shall argue that
Plato provides a coherent account of
the philosopher-ruler’s motivation and
that it is to be found in the political
implications of his epistemological
education in the theory of the forms.
In conclusion, however, I shall suggest
that there is a price to pay for the
theoretical coherence of Plato’s
account in respect of the practical
prospects for the philosopher-ruler’s
successful return.
Having completed his account of the
philosopher’s ascent, Plato considers
what might be assumed to be a
drawback in a potential ruler: a
reluctance to govern. ‘It won’t be
surprising,’ Socrates suggests, ‘if those
who get so far are unwilling to involve
themselves in human affairs, and if
their minds long to remain in the
realm above’ (517c-d). Socrates would
appear to have a point. He has already
suggested that, if they returned to the
cave, they would be blinded by the
dark as once they were blinded by the
light and make fools of themselves as
a result (517a-d). Worse still, they
would rightly return in fear of their
lives: given the opportunity, Socrates
reflects, the other inhabitants of the
cave would be sure to kill them (516c-
517a).
Socrates cannot be accused of
sugaring the pill. Yet far from viewing
his reluctance as a problem, for Plato
it is an indication of the philosopher’s
fitness to rule. Socrates maintains that
‘the state whose prospective rulers
come to their duties with the least
enthusiasm is bound to have the best
and most tranquil government, and
the state whose rulers are eager to
rule the worst’ (520d). The argument is
that only those rulers who have
experienced a way of life preferable to
political governance – namely, the life
of philosophical contemplation – will
be just rulers, for having experienced
the philosophical life they will not
seek self-satisfaction through the
attainment of political power. In
Socrates’ words, they will not ‘hope to
snatch compensation for their own
inadequacy from a political career’
(521a). Rulers eager to hold office
inevitably compete for power,
condemning the state to endless
internecine strife. The just state
requires rulers who hold themselves
aloof from their task; who possess
what, after Nietzsche, we might term
the ‘pathos of distance.’2 In Nicholas
White’s summary, ‘philosophising is
essential to ruling because it is the
activity that is preferable to ruling,
and so the activity that the ruler must
have available to him if he is to wish
not to rule, where wishing not to rule
is, paradoxically, what makes it
possible for him to rule well.’3 In short,
the just ruler is a reluctant one.
There are two points to make in
respect of this argument. Firstly, whilst34
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it may explain why the reluctant ruler
is qualified to rule, it does not explain
why he would necessarily feel obliged
to do so. We shall return to this in due
course. Secondly, Plato’s insistence on
the philosopher’s reluctance raises a
question mark against another aspect
of his account. To consider this,
however, it is necessary to examine
the broader discussion that unfolds in
the central books of the Republic.
Glaucon’s agreement at 521d
concludes a discussion that begins at
471c when Socrates is reminded that
he has yet to explain how the ideal
state might be realised. It will never
see the light of day, he replies:
…till philosophers become kings in
this world, or till those we now call
kings and rulers really and truly
become philosophers, and political
power and philosophy thus come
into the same hands, while the
many natures now content to follow
either to the exclusion of the other
are forcibly debarred from doing so.
This is what I have hesitated to say
so long, knowing what a paradox it
would sound; for it is not so easy to
see that there is no other road to
real happiness, either for society or
the individual. (473d-e)
Plato sets himself an immense task in
this passage, not simply in view of the
contempt in which the philosopher is
commonly held – the topic on which
Adeimantus will soon hold forth (cf.
487b-d) – but in view of the argument
that is advanced in the dialogue as a
whole regarding the nature of justice.
Plato’s ideal state is constructed on a
definition of justice known variously
as the Principle of Specialisation or
the Natural Division of Labour. Each
individual is to perform the single task
for which by nature he is best suited:
‘one man one job’ (434c). Yet, in his
insistence that the ideal state can only
come about if rulers become
philosophers and vice-versa, Plato
would appear to predicate the
realisation of the just state on the
seeming injustice of a ‘philosopher-
ruler’; of one man with, in effect, two
jobs (philosophising and ruling).
Viewed in this light, the magnitude of
Plato’s task in the central books is
clear. For the just state to possess a
just philosopher-ruler, Plato has to
show not simply that philosophy and
ruling are mutually tolerant roles –
that the philosopher should rule
because he is best qualified to ‘multi-
task’ in this way – but that they
constitute one and the same role. If
this claim is not substantiated, then
on Plato’s own account of justice the
realisation of the just state is
significantly compromised.
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In this connexion, the philosopher’s
reluctance to rule is of particular
import. Plato argues that the
philosopher’s lack of enthusiasm for
governance is supposed to guarantee
that, upon his return, the ideal state
will not be riven by internal conflict.
His experience of, and preference for,
the life of philosophical contemplation
will deter him from seeking self-
satisfaction in the life of politics. Yet
according to Plato’s conception of
justice, such ‘multi-tasking’ is ‘the
worst of evils,’ and guaranteed to
plunge the state into conflict and
disharmony (434c). In short, it is a
prescription for injustice. Far from
fulfilling the task set out at 473d-e,
Plato’s insistence on the philosopher’s
reluctance suggests a calamitous
irony: the philosopher is just –
according to the ‘one man one job’
thesis – only if he refuses to rule and
remains outside the cave. Does Plato’s
account of how the ideal state is
realised founder on this irony? Does it
betray Socrates’ claim that, in
expecting the philosopher to return to
the cave, a just demand is made of just
men?
It is in answer to these questions that
we return to the matter of the
philosopher’s motivation. I suggested
that the fact of the philosopher’s
suitability to rule is not in itself a
reason why he need feel compelled to
do so. Nor, incidentally, is Socrates’
additional suggestion at 520b-c that
the philosopher will feel obliged to
repay the society that provided for his
education; justice as the repayment of
what one owes was dismissed at the
beginning of Book I (cf. 331d). To
discover the true source of the
philosopher’s motivation we need to
consider the specific details of his
education.  
When Socrates says that, however
reluctantly, the philosopher ruler will
have to return to the cave, Glaucon
raises his own cry of injustice. Picking
up on the implication that the lives of
philosophy and politics are distinct, he
objects that ‘we shall be compelling
them to live a life poorer than they
might live’ (519d-e). Socrates replies:
The object of our legislation […] is
not the special welfare of any
particular class in our society, but of
the society as a whole; and it uses
persuasion or compulsion to unite
all citizens and make them share
together the benefits which each
individually can confer on the
community; and its purpose in
fostering this attitude is not to leave
everyone to please himself, but to
make each man a link in the unity of
the whole. (519e-520a)
The recurrent suggestion that
‘persuasion or compulsion’ will be
required to ensure that the
philosopher fulfil his obligation is
rather troubling. It is one thing to say
that the philosopher will be reluctant
to return but ultimately understand
that it is his duty, quite another that
force will be required. It is as though
Plato does not fully appreciate the
implications of his own account of the
philosopher’s education. On my
argument, if, notwithstanding his
reluctance, the philosopher requires
‘persuasion or compulsion’ to return,
then he is not a philosopher; there is
something fundamental he has failed
to comprehend in the course of his
education. To have properly
understood the ascent out of the cave
is in itself to have understood the duty
to return and be motivated to obey it.
Moreover, it is thus that the strict
identity of the philosophical and the
political demanded by the Principle of
Specialisation is maintained.
What is it, then, that the true
philosopher understands? It is agreed
that the simile of the cave situates the
ethical and epistemological concerns
of the similes of the sun and of the
divided line in a political context. Yet
nothing specific is added in the detail
of the simile that points to its
explicitly political implications. The
reason for this, as the true philosopher
understands, is that the duty and
motivation to return is inscribed in the
theory of the forms itself.
From the very beginning of Plato’s
account of the true philosopher at
474b, the latter is distinguished from
the mere ‘lovers of sights and sounds’
(476b) by his ability to understand the
relation between the ‘one’ and the
‘many.’4 Each eidos or form, he says, is
in itself ‘single’ or ‘one’, ‘but they seem
to be many because they appear
everywhere in combination with
actions and material bodies and with
each other’ (476a). However, the lover
of sights and sounds does not
understand this: ‘Those who love
looking and listening are delighted by
beautiful sounds and colours and
shapes […] but their minds are
incapable of seeing and delighting in
the form of beauty itself’ (476b).
In short, they fail to understand
the ‘oneness’ of the form in its
‘many’ sensible manifestations. The
philosopher, on the other hand,
‘believes in the form of beauty and can
see both it and the particular things
which share in it, and does not
confuse particular things and that in
which they share’ (476d). He
understands that two instances of
beauty – to borrow Socrates’ example
– relate to each other not in terms of
empirical resemblances between them,
but in terms of their mutual
participation in the form of beauty.
The process of understanding this
relation is depicted in the
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philosopher’s progress up the divided
line and reiterated in a political
context in the ascent out of the cave,
culminating in the vision of the good
in itself. The suggestion is that the
relation between the form of the good
and the other forms is analogous to
the relation between the forms and
their physical manifestations; the form
of the good, as ‘responsible for
whatever is right and valuable in
anything’ (517c), understood as the
‘one’ in which the ‘many’ forms
participate or share.
It is often argued that the philosopher
understands the imperative to return
in relation to this vision of the good.
As Julia Annas writes in her influential
introduction to the Republic, the
philosopher-rulers ‘know what is just
because they have the knowledge that
is based on the form of the good. Their
return is demanded by the justice that
prescribes disinterestedly what is best
for all.’5 On this reading, the
philosopher’s motivation is very
abstract; he takes a wholly impersonal
view of his interests and sets aside the
life of contemplation because his
judgements are made ‘in the light of
the impersonal good.’6 Yet for Annas
such an account begs the question
why the philosopher would wish to
sacrifice himself in this manner (‘why
should I do what justice requires?’).7
The argument that the philosopher-
ruler would not perceive a conflict
between justice and his own interest
since he has been trained to
understand himself as being ‘merely’ a
part of the whole, is rejected on the
grounds that it ‘only raises the more
urgently the question why in that case
I should want to be a [philosopher-
ruler].’ ‘Justice,’ she says, alluding to
the demand made of Socrates at the
beginning of the dialogue (cf. 367d),
‘was to have been shown to be in my
interests. But now it requires that I
abstract completely from my
interests.’8
However, I would suggest that Annas’s
contention is predicated on what,
from a Platonic point of view, is a false
premise: that to understand oneself as
part of a whole is thereby to be
‘merely’ a part, and that to ‘cease to
care about my own happiness in a
specially intimate way’ – i.e. as an
atomistic individual - is to ‘positively
stop being human.’9 Whilst this may
reflect Annas’s conception of the
human, it is not a reflection of Plato’s
view. Regardless of the offence to our
liberal-humanist sensibilities, it is
essential to recognise this if we are to
understand the philosopher-ruler’s
motivation.
To this end, it is necessary to examine
the philosopher’s motivation not
simply in relation to his crowning
vision of the good, but his education in
the forms as a whole. Recall Socrates’
insistence that, in the just state, each
man is a ‘link in the unity of the
whole.’ It is a reminder that bears
repetition, since in the light of the
education in the forms it can be seen
as the political counterpart of the
epistemological relation between the
one and the many. 
By it, the philosopher understands his
particularity – his belonging to the
many – in relation to the one, to the
community as a whole. Specifically, he
understands his just participation in
the whole as an obligation to rule. As
in the epistemological relation
between the particular and the form in
which it participates, the philosopher
understands that it is only in his
proper participation in the whole that
his own ‘usefulness and value’ (505a)
is manifest. As a result, the
philosopher-ruler does not consider
his return to involve a personal loss or
the means by which he surrenders his
humanity and becomes ‘merely’ a part
of the whole. Phrased otherwise, he
does not equate acting in accordance
with the good with acting
impersonally. Rather – and most
importantly – it is only in his return to
the cave that he becomes properly
human. This is not to suggest,
however, that the philosopher’s
motivation is consequently selfish,
where selfishness is understood as
deficiency in one’s consideration for
others. He understands his good as the
good of the whole.  
37
Why the Philosopher Returns to the Cave D J Sheppard 
[Cave]
Such an understanding accords with
the account of justice in the state and
the individual in Book IV. According to
the Principle of Specialisation, every
individual in the just state
understands the role for which he is
properly suited. The latter is
determined by the predominance in
the individual’s soul of one of its three
‘parts’: the rational, the spirited, or the
appetitive. The majority, those in
whose souls the desiring part is
dominant, enter the class of ‘artisans
and businessmen’ (434b); those in
whose souls the spirited part is
dominant form the military class; and
those few in whose souls the rational
part is dominant will become the
ruling class (the class later named
philosopher-rulers). Strictly speaking,
there are no just individuals; only the
just state in which each individual
component plays its proper role.
Considered apart from the whole, each
individual is, qua individual, ‘unjust,’
since as an individual he lacks the
harmony that is only to be found in
the just collective. No one is self-
sufficient (cf. 396b). Whilst it is indeed
Plato’s view that the best soul is one in
which the rational part of the soul
predominates (441c-442d), that
‘supremacy’ is only meaningful in so
far as the soul understands its proper
relation to the whole. There is nothing
‘impersonal’ about this understanding;
on Plato’s terms it is the apogee of
self-knowledge. It is what the
philosopher-ruler understands, and it
is the source of his motivation.
Thus, Glaucon’s claim that an injustice
is done to the philosopher in depriving
him of the life of philosophical
contemplation is a misnomer, and
suggests that Glaucon has missed the
point. What would be unjust is the
disjunction between the philosophical
and the political that his objection
presupposes. However, as the Principle
of Specialisation requires and as the
education in the forms establishes,
philosophising and ruling are one and
the same task. Consequently, if, in
insisting upon the philosopher’s
reluctance, Plato maintains that the
life of philosophy is separate from the
life of politics, then we have to
conclude that in this instance he
creates an unnecessary tension in his
own account. He underestimates the
extent to which the preceding account
provides an explanation of the
philosopher’s motivation to return,
and why the call to do so is indeed a
just demand made of just men.
At the beginning of the essay I
proposed that, if Plato cannot provide
an adequate account of why the
philosopher-ruler returns to the cave
that accords with his earlier definition
of justice, then the theoretical
coherence of the argument advanced
in the middle books of the Republic is
undermined. I argued that such an
account is to be found in the detail of
the philosopher’s education. However,
there is, I suggest, a practical price to
pay for this theoretical coherence that
in its turn compromises Plato’s vision.   
It follows from the account of the
philosopher-ruler that everything he
needs in order to rule is contained in
his education in the forms. It is thus
that ‘political power and philosophy
come into the same hands,’ and thus
that the philosopher-ruler is
motivated to return; yet it also the
reason that we fear for the
philosopher-ruler’s chances of
practical success. Why?
My concern centres on how the
philosopher-ruler overcomes the
hostility of his former fellows and
establishes his authority. In Book IV we
are told that in the ideal state
governors and governed ‘will agree
about who ought to rule’ (431e). But
when in Book V attention turns to the
practical matter of realising the ideal
state there is a question mark over
how this agreement is reached. The
issue is highlighted in the simile of the
ship (cf. 488a-489c). Ostensibly, the
purpose of the simile is to account for
why the philosopher is an outcast in
contemporary society. The politicians
of the day are compared to the crew
who, though none of them
understands the art of navigation,
quarrel over who ought to command
the ship. The philosopher is compared
to the true navigator who has studied
‘the seasons of the year, the sky, the
stars,’ and so on, but whom the crew
regard as ‘a word-spinner and a star-
gazer, of no use to them at all’ (489a).
On this scenario, we wonder what
would happen if the true navigator
resolved to assert his claim to the
captaincy. On the face of it, there is
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little reason to suppose he would be
successful. How is he to convince the
crew that he is their rightful ruler?
What means does he have at his
disposal? The problem is that the
navigator turns to the task
unequipped with the rhetorical skills
of persuasion or any other trick of the
political trade that would appear
essential if he is to obtain a hearing. It
is difficult to conceive that he will not
require such additional skills: the crew
do not even believe that the art of
navigation exists (cf. 488e). It seems
that the best the navigator can hope
for is to be ignored; should he persist,
he will more than likely be thrown
overboard.
Plato subsequently disputes this
conclusion, though the basis on which
he wishes to do so is unclear.10 At one
point Socrates says that the populace
will have to be ‘compelled’ to listen to
the philosopher-ruler (499b). A little
further on the suggestion is that the
dominion of the philosopher-ruler will
be recognised ‘if instead of bullying
[the masses] you are gentle with them,
and try to remove their prejudice
against learning and show them what
you mean by philosophers’ (499e-
500a). The latter would seem to be the
only alternative available to the
navigator, but again we wonder how
he is supposed to go about the task.
As we have seen, there is a similar mix
of optimism and pessimism in the
simile of the cave. Socrates makes the
point that upon his return the
philosopher will ‘blunder and make a
fool of himself’ (517d). But he adds
that this stage is only temporary: in
time the philosopher will re-accustom
himself to the dark and ‘see a
thousand times better’ than his former
fellows (520e). Yet it is not the
philosopher-ruler’s sight that is at
issue; rather it is his ability to
convince the prisoners of the clarity of
his vision. Once again, it is difficult to
deny that the more realistic possibility
is the suggestion that ‘they would kill
him if they could lay hands on him’
(517a). After all, he will challenge
every conception the prisoners hold
dear, and to have any chance of
success it would appear imperative
that he possesses the most
sophisticated rhetorical and
persuasive skills if he is to ‘turn’ them.
Crucially, however, Plato’s account
precludes the possibility of the
philosopher-ruler being thus armed.
The claim that the just state will only
see the light of day when philosophers
become rulers and rulers become
philosophers, and ‘political power and
philosophy thus come into the same
hands’ (473d), demands the strict
identification of the philosophical and
the political: all the philosopher-ruler
requires to rule must be contained in
the education in the forms. For this
education then to be appended by
rhetorical skills that are inimical to it
is to undermine this identification, and
to render the saviour of the just state
the epitome of injustice (philosopher-
ruler and rhetorician). Consequently,
the philosopher-ruler must return
without such resources. Perhaps it is
the recognition of this practical blind
spot in his account that causes Plato
to oscillate between optimism and
pessimism when considering the
prospects for the philosopher-ruler’s
return. In the final analysis, it is
difficult to sugar the pill. Little wonder
if the philosopher appears reluctant.
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Language, Truth and Logic (LTL) is
nothing if not ambitious.  In a little
under 150 pages, Ayer aims to resolve
the major questions of philosophy.  He
doesn’t propose to resolve the
questions by actually answering them,
but by showing them to be spurious.
They are spurious, he thinks, because
they concern questions of
‘metaphysics’.  And Ayer thinks he can
show that metaphysical questions, and
the answers which philosophers
propose to them, are uniformly
meaningless.
I think few would disagree that there
is something slightly naïve about
Ayer’s project – or that he doesn’t
entirely succeed in carrying it out.
However, the question I want to look
at here is whether the basic idea
behind the project is a sound one.
Ayer’s guiding principle – that a
statement that is not verifiable is
meaningless – is often criticised on
the grounds that it is either baseless,
or worse, inconsistent.  However, I will
argue that the situation for Ayer is not
as bad here as is sometimes made out.
That’s not to say that I will agree with
Ayer: I do not agree with many of the
conclusions Ayer reaches, and I do not
think he provides satisfactory
arguments for them for reasons I will
explain.  However, I also think there is
more to be said in his defence than
one might think, even though it
ultimately isn’t quite enough to save
his project.  In the following, I will try
to explain why this is.
Ayer’s aim, as I said above, was
to argue against ‘metaphysics’.
Metaphysics, as he understands it, is
the activity of trying to discover
matters of fact which cannot be
known on the basis of experience.
Ayer thinks he can show this activity
to be illegitimate, by showing that the
propositions metaphysics deals in are
meaningless.
In order to demonstrate this, Ayer
proposes a criterion by which we can
sort meaningful from meaningless
statements.  The criterion he calls the
‘verifiability criterion of meaning’ or
‘principle of verification’ (POV).  The
principle of verification says that a
statement is factually significant for a
person if and only if ‘he knows how to
verify the proposition which it
purports to express – that is, if he
knows what observations would lead
him, under certain conditions, to
accept the proposition as being true,
or reject it as being false’.  In other
words – as he explains himself later –
a statement is meaningful if and only
if there are possible experiences
that would count as evidence for or
against it.
The POV as stated applies to ‘factual’
propositions, that is, those which aim
to make true or false statements about
the way the world is.  In addition,
however, Ayer allows statements to be
meaningful when they are analytic or
tautologous, that is, true simply in
virtue of the words involved.
Examples of such statements are ‘ewes
are female’, or ‘a numismatist collects
coins’.  Statements like this are
meaningful, but don’t strictly say
anything about the world – rather,
Ayer says, they express relations
between the meanings of the words
involved.  However, Ayer thinks that if
a statement is neither analytic, nor
empirically verifiable, then it is
meaningless.
Ayer gives as an example of the sort of
claim this criterion will class as
meaningless, the sceptical claim that
the world we perceive is ‘unreal’.  This
sounds at first like a meaningful (if
unlikely) supposition.  However, no
observations could possibly count for
or against its truth: observations could
only confirm how we experience the
world rather than the nature of the
reality behind our experience.  Nor is
the supposition that the world is
radically different to how we
experience it analytically false – its
falsity does not follow simply from the
meanings of the words involved.
Therefore, by Ayer’s criterion the claim
that the world behind our perceptions
is unreal is meaningless; it has no
chance of even counting as true or
false.40




I The argument behind
Language, Truth and 
Logic – The
Verifiability Criterion
Having introduced the principle of
verification, Ayer goes on in the rest of
the book to apply it to various areas of
discourse, philosophical and
otherwise.  The areas he looks at are
primarily areas where we might think
metaphysical propositions are
involved, but which seem to be
perfectly meaningful.  Thus, his aim in
discussing them is to show how we
can understand them without the
intrusion of meaningless metaphysics.
There isn’t room here to go through
everything Ayer says, but I’ll mention a
selection of his ideas to give the
general picture.
The first question Ayer raises is the
nature of philosophical inquiry.  As he
is, essentially, writing a work of
philosophy, he needs to show that
doing philosophy does not essentially
require us to inquire into metaphysical
questions – factual questions which
cannot be decided by appeal to
experiential evidence.
To counter this suggestion, Ayer
argues that philosophy is in the
business of analysis.  Analysis, for
Ayer, is simply inquiry into the
meanings, or as he prefers to put it,
the ‘definitions’ of words.  A familiar
example of this kind of inquiry (though
not Ayer’s) might be the case of
analysing the notion of ‘knowledge’.
Traditional analyses of knowledge
consist in putting forward some
definition of the term ‘knowledge’ in
terms which do not presuppose it,
such as ‘knowledge is justified true
belief’.  This definition will either be
analytically true, or (as in this case) we
will notice that there are cases that
fall under the analysis which we would
not class as knowledge, or vice versa,
in which the definition will be
analytically false.  The important point
about this kind of inquiry is that there
is nothing ‘metaphysical’ involved in it.
We are merely looking for some way of
characterising the situations in which
we would apply the term ‘knowledge’,
and the knowledge we get from our
inquiry is essentially just of analytic
truths.  If we succeed in doing this, we
learn something not about the world,
but about the meanings of our words.
Ayer’s applies this idea in a more
controversial way in his analysis of
statements about ordinary material
objects (see LTL, pp 64-69).  The
problem here is that on a common
understanding material objects are
thought to be ‘substances’ which exist
in the external world entirely
independently of our experience of
them.  But talk about metaphysical
substances that exist independently of
our perception of them is unverifiable,
since Ayer thinks there are no
experiences which would count as
evidence for the truth of sentences
about these substances.  However,
given the frequency with which we
talk about material objects it would be
highly implausible for Ayer to dismiss
all such talk as meaningless.  His
solution is to propose that statements
about material objects are not really
about mind-independent substances
at all.  Rather, they are what he calls
‘logical constructions’ out of the
immediate contents of our experience,
also known as ‘sense-contents’.
Ayer’s idea is that we can translate
any sentence that contains the word
‘table’ into an equivalent statement
that refers only to sense-contents.
Roughly , his claim is that a material
object can be defined as a group of
connecting sense-contents that bear a
certain kind of relation of similarity to
each other.  Thus, what characterises
the table in front of me is the fact that
the sense-data in a certain (table-
shaped) region of my sensory field are
all similar (brown, hard, etc.) and are
different from the directly adjacent
parts of my sensory field (which are
empty).  Statements about tables,
then, can be translated into other
statements that refer only to relations
of similarity between sense-data by
referring to relations between brown,
hard elements of my sense-field and
their relations to other parts of my
experience. 41
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II The Elimination of 
Metaphysics
Philosophy, then, does not violate the
principle of verifiability, on the
grounds that philosophical knowledge
is ultimately not ‘factual’, but just
about the meanings of words.
Another area in which the same
applies is mathematics and logic (see
LTL, pp. 75-87).  The apparent problem
here is that mathematical propositions
like ‘6+7=13’ appear to give factual
knowledge, but are not known on the
basis of sense-experience – you can
know that 6+7=13 without ever
counting any actual objects.  Again,
however, Ayer argues that
mathematical propositions are true
just in virtue of the meanings of the
constituent symbols (‘6’, ‘7’, ‘+’, ‘=’ and
‘13’), so they are not really ‘factual’.
The same goes for logical principles.
A further area in which Ayer applies
the principle of verifiability is in ethics
(LTL, pp. 102-114).  As Ayer notes
ethical propositions pose a problem
for his criterion.  Consider an ethical
statement such as ‘killing innocent
people is wrong’.  This statement
certainly seems to be meaningful.
However, it isn’t obviously analytic,
since it isn’t clear you could come to
know it is true simply by virtue of
reflecting on the meanings of the
words involved in stating it.  Nor is it
obviously synthetic, since it is not
clear what observations would count
for or against it.  But if it is neither
analytic nor synthetic, then the
principle of verifiability would class it
as meaningless.  This is clearly
unacceptable.
One obvious tactic that Ayer could
pursue in accounting for moral and
other value judgements would be to
adopt what we might call a
descriptivist theory of ethical terms.
According to a descriptivist theory,
ethical judgements are equivalent to
statements of non-ethical fact.  One
such theory, for example, is
utilitarianism.  According to
utilitarianism to say that some action
is right is to say it is conducive to the
general happiness.  However, Ayer
thinks this kind of analysis is
unsatisfactory.  For Ayer, we can recall,
a philosophical theory such as
utilitarianism must – if it is true – be
analytically true, true as a matter of
definition.  However, he argues that
since it is not contradictory to assert
that something is morally right
without being conducive to general
happiness, utilitarianism cannot be
analytically true.  The same goes, Ayer
thinks, for other ‘descriptivist’ theories
that equate being right or good with
the satisfaction of some factual
condition.
Ayer’s alternative is to deny that moral
judgements express propositions at all.
Or rather, they do not convey any
propositions other than the factual
propositions that are already involved
in stating them.  If I say ‘killing
innocent people is wrong’, then I am
expressing no proposition, but merely
my disapproval of killing innocent
people.  To use Ayer’s way of putting it,
stating that killing innocent people is
wrong is like writing ‘killing innocent
people’ with a special kind of
exclamation mark designed to show
that I am expressing disapproval.  If,
on the other hand, I say ‘it was wrong
for Pol Pot to have killed so many
innocent people’, my assertion has
some factual content – it asserts that
Pol Pot killed so many innocent people
– but in addition my statement only
serves to express my disapproval of Pol
Pot’s killing those people.  Ayer’s
theory is therefore sometimes known
as the ‘boo-hooray’ theory of moral
judgements – saying that killing
innocent people is wrong is very much
like saying something along the lines
of ‘killing innocent people – Boo!’ –
since ‘boo’ expresses disapproval of
something without making a factual
statement.
Ayer applies his criterion in a number
of further areas, but there isn’t time to
outline them here.  However, I hope
this gives a flavour of Ayer’s general
project.  The basic theme, as we have
seen, is that Ayer wants to go through
various areas of discourse (talk about
material objects, mathematics, ethics,
and also truth, probability, other
minds, and other topics) to show how
they can be interpreted in line with
the basic guiding principle – the
principle of verification.
There are therefore (at least) two key
questions we might ask about the
success of Ayer’s arguments.  The first
question is whether his conclusions
follow from the principle of
verification – whether, if the principle
is true, we are committed to the views
that he says we are committed to.  The
second question is whether the
principle of verification is in fact true.
Although it is a very interesting
question, and crucial for a full
evaluation of Ayer’s views, I want to
pass over the first question relatively
briefly.  However, I will make a couple
of comments.  The first is that if the
principle of verification is true then it
is clear that his overall strategy is a
coherent one.  For a start, the truth of
the principle would give him a good
reason for saying that many
‘metaphysical’ conclusions are
unverifiable.  It also seems a good
idea, if he is to defend the principle, to
show that it does not class the
majority of our talk as meaningless –
suggesting that it might have to be
analysed in unfamiliar terms.
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However, even if we grant this it is not
clear that all his conclusions will
follow.  Consider for example his claim
that statements about ordinary
material objects can be defined in
terms of sense-contents.  The principle
of verification says that a factual
statement is meaningful only if it is
verifiable, in the sense that there can
be experiences that count as evidence
for or against it.  But on an ordinary
understanding there can be evidence
that counts for the existence of a real,
physical table – seeing the table in
front of you, for example!  To prove
that tables are really constructions
from sense-contents Ayer needs to
show not only that sense-contents
don’t conclusively verify the existence
of a table, but that they provide no
evidence for it whatsoever.
Presumably Ayer does think this,
otherwise he would not have felt the
need to argue for this view.  But he
doesn’t really put forward an
argument for it.  For this reason, I
think that some of his conclusions are
doubtful even if we grant the strong
principle of verification.
Nevertheless, there are other areas –
such as ethics – where he clearly does
need to do some work.  For example, if
we think there is a plain and
irreducible fact that, say, killing is
wrong, then it is very difficult to see
how it could be verifiable in Ayer’s
sense.  So if he thinks this statement is
meaningful at all, he needs to explain
how that can be.  So I think that much
of what he says is at least well-
motivated given his starting point.
I want now to focus on whether the
principle of verification is actually
true.  I will begin by looking at some
problems with this principle.
The first question we might ask is why
Ayer thinks the principle of
verification is actually true.  When he
introduces the principle in the first
chapter of LTL, he has the following to
say about it:
As to the validity of the principle… a
demonstration will be given in the
course of this book.  For it will be
shown that all propositions which
have factual content are empirical
hypotheses; and that the function of
an empirical hypothesis is to provide
a rule for the anticipation of
experience.  And this means … that
a statement which is not relevant to
any experience is not an empirical
hypothesis, and accordingly has no
factual content.  But this is precisely
what the principle of verifiability
asserts. (LTL, 41)
Now this appears to be an argument
for the principle of verification.  The
crucial premise is that the function of
an empirical hypothesis is to predict
experiences.  The idea is presumably
that an unverifiable statement will
predict no experiences, and will
therefore fail to be an ‘empirical
hypothesis’, and will therefore have no
factual content – in other words it will
be meaningless.  Ayer says that he will
demonstrate later in the book that the
function of an empirical hypothesis is
to predict experiences.  But in fact,
when the issue comes up, he only says:
What is the purpose of formulating
hypotheses?  Why do we construct
these systems in the first place?  The
answer is that they are designed to
enable us to anticipate the course of
our sensations (LTL, 97)
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IV Problems with the
Principle of
Verification
This is not the argument we were
hoping for.  It is merely a statement of
the view he needs to prove.  Moreover,
it is hardly the sort of thing we can
just accept on trust.  Everyone will
agree that it is a function of
formulating hypotheses to predict
experiences.  But it is a big step to
conclude from this that the only
reason we formulate hypotheses is to
predict experiences, which is what
Ayer needs for his argument to go
through.  On the contrary, someone
who disagrees with the principle of
verification (a metaphysician, for
example) will argue that one
important reason for forming
hypotheses about the world is simply
to try to acquire knowledge of the
truth, whether or not doing so helps us
predict experiences.  Ayer needs some
reason why someone who holds this
view is wrong.  But he doesn’t, as far
as I can see, provide one.
I think it is fair to say, therefore, that
Ayer provides little direct justification
for his crucial principle of verification.
However, this isn’t a crippling
objection as it stands.  For Ayer could
reply that the proof of the principle is
to be found in its application (see
Foster 1985, 31, for further discussion
of this possibility).  He could say that
we will see it is true simply because
the results we get by applying it can
independently be seen to be true.
Now this would be a legitimate
response, were the results it gave
intuitively true.  But there is little
doubt that they are not; it is far from
obviously true that statements about
material objects are really about
sense-contents, or that ethical
statements are not genuine
propositions.  No-one is going to
accept these claims without a strong
independent argument to suppose
that things must be that way.  Now he
would have a strong argument to this
effect if he could independently
demonstrate the verification principle.
But as we have seen, he doesn’t do
this.
A further, related objection to the
verification principle is that not only
does it lack justification, but it is
actually incoherent.  The principle
says, as we saw, that all meaningful
statements are either empirically
verifiable, or analytic.  Now this
principle applies to all statements.
But it takes the form of a statement
itself.  Thus, it should apply to itself.
That is, it should itself be either
empirically verifiable or analytic.  The
difficulty is that the statement does
not appear to fall into either of these
categories.
On the one hand, it does not appear to
be empirically verifiable.  In order to be
empirically verifiable, there would have
to be experiences we could have that
gave evidence that all meaningful
statements are empirically verifiable or
analytic.  But it is not clear what
experiences would do this.  One problem
here is that you don’t experience
whether a statement is meaningful or
not, so it’s difficult to see how
experiences could help you decide
which statements are meaningful.  On
the other hand, the principle does not
seem to be analytic either.  The difficulty
is that analytic truths are supposed to
be true in virtue of the meanings of the
words involved.  And this suggests that
if you know the meanings of the words
involved then you should be able to tell
straight off whether the statement is
true.  For example, if you know what a
ewe is (i.e. a female sheep) then you can
tell straight off that ewes are female.
But this doesn’t seem true of the
principle of verification.  We all,
presumably, understand the words
involved in stating it (‘meaningful’,
‘experiences’, and so on).  But few would
claim that they could see straight off
that it is true.
There are two major problems, then,
with Ayer’s principle of verification.
The first is that he doesn’t provide us
with any reason to think it is true.  The
second is that the statement is
incoherent, as it declares itself
meaningless.  It is, in other words, a
prime bit of metaphysics.  If these
charges are correct, then Ayer’s
project is clearly deeply flawed.
Let us look at whether these criticisms
will stick.  I will take them in reverse
order.
The second criticism was that the
principle of verification classes itself
as meaningless, so cannot consistently
be held.  In fact Ayer addresses this
problem briefly in the introduction to
the second edition of LTL.  He says,
While I wish the principle of
verification itself to be regarded, not
as an empirical hypothesis, but as a
definition, it is not supposed to be
entirely arbitrary.  It is indeed open
to anyone to adopt a different
criterion of meaning and so to
produce an alternative definition
which may very well correspond to
one of the ways in which the word
‘meaning’ is commonly used…
Nevertheless I think that, unless it
satisfied the principle of
verification, [a statement] would
not be capable of being understood
in the sense in which either
scientific hypotheses or common-
sense statements are habitually
understood. (LTL, 16)
There seem to be two strands to what
Ayer is saying here.  One strand is that
the principle of verification is a
‘definition’, and that it is open to44
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others to adopt a different definition.
On this view, it seems that the
principle is supposed to be a
recommendation about how to talk
about meaning, rather than a
statement about what meaning is.  On
the other hand, Ayer suggests that the
criterion is not entirely arbitrary, and
corresponds to the way in which
certain statements are ‘habitually
understood’.  On this view, it seems
that Ayer is saying that the principle
of verification should be seen as an
analytic truth, that is, a statement
true just in virtue of the meanings of
the words involved (such as
‘meaning’).  Let us ask whether either
of these responses could work for Ayer.
The first view is that the principle of
verification is primarily a
recommendation about the way we
should talk about meaning.  This view
certainly has some advantages.  For
example, suppose someone objects to
Ayer that the conclusions Ayer draws
from it about material objects, ethics,
and the rest, are not intuitively true.
On this view he can merely respond
that he is not describing how we do
understand statements about material
objects and ethics, but how we should
talk about them, so it’s irrelevant if his
conclusions are not intuitively true –
he is not describing them but
proposing how they should be
reformed.
But this leaves him with two problems.
One is simply that it is very difficult to
justify the claim that we should only
regard statements that meet the
principle of verification as meaningful.
Presumably a metaphysician, for
example, will disagree, and will think
that Ayer’s proposal is a very bad way
to talk about meaning.  It is difficult to
see how Ayer could respond to this.
Another difficulty is that Ayer’s theory
about ethical statements says that a
statement like ‘you should do X’ just
means something like ‘X – Hooray!’.  If
this is so, then the statement ‘you
should only regard statements as
meaningful when they meet the
principle of verification’ just means
‘the principle of verification – Hooray!’.
But if this is true, we would have to
interpret the whole book as being
devoid of arguments, and merely
expressing Ayer’s approval of the
verification principle and his
disapproval of metaphysics.  This, I
take it, is not how he means it.
The other suggestion is that Ayer
should say that the principle of
verification is an analytic truth.  I
agree with Foster (Foster 1985, 5-6)
that this is what Ayer should say.  The
main advantage of this is that it fits in
with his conception of philosophy.
Ayer argued, remember, that
philosophy is all about analysis, where
analysis involves finding connections
between the meanings of different
words that we use.  Thus, if the
principle of verification is a bit of
philosophy – which it presumably is –
the natural thing to say is that it can
be reached by a bit of analysis of the
words involved: ‘meaning’,
‘verification’, and so on.
The problem that we raised above with
this idea was that unlike ‘ewes are
female’, the principle of verification is
not obviously true even if you
understand the words.  But as Foster
points out (1985, 5) this is not really a
major problem.  If Ayer is right, then
there are many unobvious analytic
truths.  For example, philosophical
claims that material objects are really
about sense-contents, or that ethical
statements do not express
propositions, are on Ayer’s view
analytic but not obvious.  So are
unobvious mathematical propositions
like ‘every even number is the sum of
two primes’ (assuming this is true).  In
all these cases, we would need to think
hard before we realised that the
propositions in question are true, even
if their truth was, ultimately, just a
matter of the meanings of the words.
So there is no reason to think the
principle of verification should be any
different.
I think it is consistent, then, for Ayer to
regard the principle of verification as
analytically true.  But this doesn’t
mean that he has any justification for
holding it.  This brings us to our second
point.  Is there any reason to think
that it is actually true?
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I think it is fair, in view of what we
said in section III, to say that Ayer
himself never really gives us a good
reason to accept the principle of
verification.  However, I think there is
a plausible line of argument that leads
to something like the principle.
Whether it gives us exactly Ayer’s
version of the principle is a more
subtle issue, however, as we will see.
Let’s begin by asking what reason
there is for thinking that verification
has anything to do with meaning at
all.  On the face of it the two notions
are not intimately connected.  A
sentence means something if it
succeeds in representing some state of
affairs as obtaining.  But it is verifiable
if we have some way of recognising
that the state of affairs it represents
obtains.  These appear at first sight to
be two entirely different things.
However, there are considerations that
suggest that meaning and verification
are more closely linked.  Here is one
sort of argument that leads to this
conclusion.  I will put the argument in
terms of ‘linguistic units’ for reasons I
will explain shortly – by ‘linguistic
unit’ I mean either a word or a
sentence.  We will see that the
argument runs a bit differently
depending on what exactly we take a
linguistic unit to be.
The argument I have in mind has three
premises.  The first is that for a
linguistic unit to be meaningful it
must be possible for someone to
understand it.  This, I think, is very
plausible, since it is ultimately through
people using and understanding
linguistic devices like words and
sentences that they acquire a
meaning.
The second premise is that someone
can only be said to understand a
linguistic unit if they are able to
distinguish between cases in which it
applies and cases in which it does not.
This, again, I think is quite plausible.
For example, consider a sentence like
‘it’s raining’.  It is plausible to think
that someone would only count as
understanding it if they could (at least
sometimes) distinguish between cases
when it was raining and cases when it
was not.  Or in the case of a word,
someone could only count as
understanding the term ‘dog’ if they
could distinguish between cases
where a dog was present and cases
where no dog was present.
The third premise is that in order to be
able to distinguish between cases
where a linguistic unit applies and
cases where it does not, it must be
possible to have experiential evidence
for when it applies and when it does
not.  This, again, is pretty plausible.
There is no way of distinguishing
between when it’s raining and when it
isn’t unless there would be some
experiential evidence (e.g. feeling
raindrops) by which we can detect the
difference.  Equally, there is no way of
distinguishing between when a dog is
present from when one isn’t unless
there can be some experiences (e.g.
the sound of barking) by which we can
tell the difference.
In summary, then, this argument
suggests a link between a linguistic
unit’s having meaning, and our being
able to verify that it applies.  It does
this because we can only be said to
understand a linguistic unit if we can
distinguish when it applies from when
it doesn’t, and to do this, there must
be some evidence by which we can do
this.  If the argument is sound then
something like the verification
principle follows, as we can conclude
that a linguistic unit can only be
meaningful if it is it is possible to have
experiential evidence for when it
applies and when it does not.  The
reason I put things in terms of
‘linguistic units’, however, is that the
argument yields very different
conclusions depending on what we
take linguistic units to be.
If we think that linguistic units are
sentences, then the argument
demonstrates that a sentence is only
meaningful if there can be evidence
for when it is true and when it is not.
This is exactly Ayer’s verification
principle.  But if we think that
linguistic units are words then things
are rather different.
To see this suppose that I am
competent at recognising dogs, and
therefore at recognising whether the
word ‘dog’ applies to anything in my
vicinity.  If this is true the word-
version of the verification principle
says that I can understand the word
‘dog’.  But then I can go on to
formulate such sentences as, ‘there
are dogs so distant from us that no-
one has, or ever will, have any46
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evidence for them’.  Now if we assume
that the other words in this sentence
are meaningful, and that a
grammatical sentence comprised from
meaningful words is itself meaningful,
then it follows that the sentence is
itself meaningful.  But it is
unverifiable – there could be no
evidence for the existence of dogs for
whose existence there is no evidence!
It follows that if we think the
verification principle applies to words
rather than sentences, Ayer’s version
of the principle does not follow, since
there can be unverifiable but
meaningful sentences.
Let us call the view that a sentence
has to be verifiable to be meaningful
the sentence-principle, and the view
that a word has to have some
verifiable conditions of application the
word-principle.  In order to work out
whether there is any argument in
what we have said for Ayer’s view, we
need to look at whether the word-
principle or the sentence-principle is
more likely to be true.  There is not
room here to consider the issue in
detail.  However, my own view is that
the word-principle is much more likely
to be true.  I’ll suggest a couple of
reasons why I think this is.
One reason is simply that I think we
have a very strong intuition that we
can form unverifiable, but meaningful,
sentences.  One example is, ‘there are
dogs that no-one will ever discover’,
which certainly seems meaningful,
despite being unverifiable.  Another
example might be the case of
scientific theories that postulate
entities for which no evidence is
known.  For example physicists
currently talk about fundamental
physical forces being explained in
terms of ‘superstrings’.  But (as I
understand it) no evidence has yet
been proposed by which a superstring
could be detected.  It seems
conceivable, then, there just is no such
evidence.  However, we would be
reluctant to say that all talk about
superstrings is, as a result,
meaningless.  It seems, then, that if
you believe the sentence-principle,
then you need some explanation of
why sentences like this seem
meaningful, but aren’t – and it’s not
too clear how such an explanation
would go.
On the other hand I don’t think there
are such strong intuitions that there
are meaningful words that would
violate the word-principle.  Or rather,
not after we adjust it slightly.  We
need to adjust it to take into account
the possibility of defining words that
do not satisfy the word-principle.  For
example suppose I defined the term
‘udog’ to apply to all the dogs for
whose existence we will never have
evidence.  Talk of udogs would then be
meaningful – since I gave a perfectly
clear definition of what I meant by it –
but we could never detect the
presence of udogs.  Thus, the principle
would need to allow not only words
that satisfy the principle themselves,
but words that are definable in words
that satisfy the principle.  The same
goes for ‘superstring’ – which
physicists could presumably define in
terms of other more recognisable
concepts if called upon to do so.  But
given this adjustment to the word-
principle there seems to be a good
case for saying that any words that
fail it are genuinely meaningless.
Another reason we might prefer the
word version of the principle is that it
gives a better explanation of the
meaning of analytic sentences.
Remember that the principle of
verification says sentences are
meaningful if they are verifiable or
analytic.  So we might ask how the
different versions of the principle of
verification we have been looking at
might classify analytic sentences.
On the one hand, the word-principle
appears to apply directly to analytic
sentences.  If we ignore sentences that
are themselves definitions, it is
plausibly true of all sentences –
analytic or synthetic – that they are
meaningful only if their constituent
words have detectable conditions of
application or are definable in terms
that do.1 On the other hand, the 47
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sentence-principle cannot be applied
directly to analytic sentences, since
there are no experiences that count as
evidence for or against the truth of
analytic sentences.  This suggests that
the sentence-principle is going to
have to be combined with some other
principle that explains the meaning of
analytic sentences.
The problem I see for the sentence-
principle might therefore be put this
way.  The natural account of what
makes analytic sentences meaningful
is that the words that form them are
meaningful and grammatically
arranged.  But the sentence ‘there are
dogs that no-one will ever discover’ is
also apparently comprised from
meaningful words grammatically
arranged.  So the believer in the
sentence-principle needs some
explanation of why this idea works for
analytic sentences, but not all non-
analytic sentences.  I am not sure that
no such explanation is available.  But
it isn’t as clear as in the case of the
word-principle what that explanation
would be.  I think, therefore, that there
at least are some reasons to think that
if any version of the verification
principle is true at all, then it is going
to be the word principle.
I have argued that although there are
considerations that point to
something like the verification
principle, they are more likely to lead
to the principle that words have to
have verifiable conditions of
application than that sentences have
to be verifiable.  I now want briefly to
comment on how much of Ayer’s
project would survive if this version of
the principle turned out to be true.
The fundamental aim of Ayer’s book,
we will remember, was to eliminate
‘metaphysics’ – for Ayer, the attempt
to gain knowledge of matters of fact
through pure thought – by showing
that it is meaningless.  But I do not
think that this project could succeed if
only the word-principle is true.
According to the weak version, it is
only necessary for a word to be
meaningful that there be some cases
in which it is possible to gain evidence
of the fact that it applies.  Thus it
allows unverifiable but meaningful
factual sentences – so by Ayer’s
definition, it will allow at least some
‘metaphysics’ to be meaningful.
Not only this, it is likely to leave just
the sorts of metaphysical statements
that Ayer dislikes most to count as
meaningful.  For example, consider the
claim that the world is completely
independent of and different from our
experience of it.  This is unverifiable,
but the words we need to express it –
‘independent of’, ‘different from’, and
so on – are clearly of a sort that would
occur in other more familiar contexts,
where we could recognise their
conditions of application: two
cogwheels can be recognisably moving
independently of one another, say, or
any two things could be recognisably
different from one another.  So we can
formulate this metaphysical claim
using words that the word-principle
counts as meaningful.  The same, I
think, would go for many other
traditional metaphysical statements.
This doesn’t mean that the word-
principle is completely devoid of anti-
metaphysical implications, however.
This is because there remain words
which we sometimes class as
meaningful, but where it is difficult to
think of any situations in which their
conditions of application could be
recognised in this way, or any
definition of the word in such terms.
One kind of case would be when a
notion was simply too ill-defined and
abstract to have any detectable
conditions of application or precise
definition.  If Ayer is right, something
like ‘The Absolute’ might be like this
(though not being familiar with the
work of C. D. Broad, from which he
takes this example, I would not wish to
endorse this claim!)
Ethical claims might also be classed as
meaningless if we adopt the word-
principle, though the issue is less clear.
On the one hand, anyone who
understands moral terms must be able
to distinguish cases when they apply
from cases when they do not – you
don’t understand ‘is morally wrong’
unless you have some ability to
distinguish morally wrong actions
from others.  But on the other hand,
when someone distinguishes cases
where a moral term applies from when
it does not, they will do this on the
basis of non-moral facts – e.g. they
will judge that an act is wrong since,
for example, it causes pain to an
innocent person.  So it is not clear
whether a moral term like ‘is good’ will
satisfy the word-criterion, since it isn’t
clear whether we can really have
experiential evidence that this term
applies in the right kind of way.
Thus, I think one could base some sort
of anti-metaphysical project on the
word-principle, by sifting out concepts
that neither have detectable
conditions of application, nor are
definable in terms that do.  But in view
of the fact that the word-principle
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allows us to formulate apparently
metaphysical statements, that project
would be little like Ayer’s.
In this paper I have tried to give a
sympathetic reading of Language,
Truth and Logic, and show that Ayer
can be defended against some of the
criticisms that are sometimes levelled
at his view.  Moreover, I have
suggested that there are reasons for
thinking that something like the
overall project of the book is well-
motivated.  However, I have also tried
to show that the anti-metaphysical
aspect of Ayer’s project relies on a
premise – the principle of verification,
as applied to sentences – which he
does not adequately justify, and which
is problematic for independent
reasons.
Ultimately, I think the problem is that
he never really overcomes the strong
intuition that at least some
unverifiable sentences are meaningful.
Nevertheless, I think that the book
retains considerable interest as an
exploration of what we would have to




1 This criterion would not work for
sentences that are definitions
because definitions contain words
– the words they are supposed to
define – which are not
independently meaningful.  For
example, suppose we try to define
‘a flotch’ to mean ‘a brown horse’,
by stipulating that the sentence ‘a
flotch is a brown horse’ is true.
But is this sentence meaningful?
According to our criterion it is
meaningful if and only if the words
are meaningful, and the words are
meaningful if and only if they
have detectable conditions of
application or they are definable in
terms that do.  So is ‘flotch’ so
definable?  Presumably only if ‘a
flotch is a brown horse’ is a
meaningful sentence… but it
should be clear that we have now
gone round in a circle.  This means
we need a different criterion for
when definitions are meaningful.
There isn’t really room here to go
into how we might formulate such
a criterion, but I don’t think it will
ultimately be a problem for this
theory.
A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic,
2nd ed., (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd.,
1970).  Referred to in the text as ‘LTL’.
Foster, John, Ayer (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1985)
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